Abstract
The development of research into what is called ‘the German resistance’ or ‘the German opposition’ has gone through various phases.1 In the first of these phases research was centred on the proof of its factual existence, its activities, motives and political attitudes. This corresponded on the one hand to a politico-psychological need in respect of the view popularly held abroad of German collective guilt, and on the other to a need to legitimise the new state of the Federal Republic.
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Notes and References
General on the literature and development of research, see the specialist biographies of U. Hochmuth, Faschismus und Widerstand: 1933–1945, ein Verzeichnis deutschsprachiger Literatur (Frankfurt, 1973) and R. Büchel, Der deutsche Widerstand im Spiegel von Fachliteratur und Publizistik seit 1945 (Munich, 1975), also the literary reviews of K. Frhr. v. Aretin in Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht, 25 (1974), 507–12, and 565–70
R. Mann, ‘Widerstand gegen den Nationalsozialismus,’ in Neue politische Literatur, 22 (1977), 425–42, and G. Plum, ‘Das “Gelände” des Widerstandes,’ marginal notes on literature about the resistance to National Socialism, in W. Benz (ed.), Miscellanea, Festschrift für Helmut Krausnick zum 75. Geburtstag (Stuttgart, 1980), pp. 93–102. For the GDR (Eastern Germany) the latest state of interpretations is given by K. Mammach, Die deutsche anti-faschistische Widerstandsbewegung 1933–1939 (Berlin 1976).
On this and the following, see in more detail K.-J. Müller ‘Die deutsche Militäropposition gegen Hitler’, on the problem of its interpretation and analysis, in Armee, Politik und Gesellschaft in Deutschland 1933–1945, studies on the relationship between the army and the NS system, 3rd edn. (Paderborn, 1981), pp. 101–23; also the relevant literature cited there.
See Hans-Josef Steinberg, ‘Thesen zum Widerstand aus der Arbeiterbewegung’, in Ch. Kiessmann and F. Pingel (eds), Gegner des Nationalsozialismus (Frankfurt/ New York, 1980), pp. 67–72 and D. Peuckert, Zur Rolle des Arbeiterwiderstandes im “Dritten Reich”, ibid. pp. 73–90, on the rôle of workers’ resistance in the Third Reich.
See Günther van Norden, ‘Widerstand im deutschen Protestantismus 1933–1945’, in ibid., pp. 103–25 and L. Volk SJ. ‘der Widerstand der katholischen Kirche, in ibid., pp. 126–39.
See A. Klönne, Gegen den Strom, report on youth resistance in the Third Reich (Hanover and Frankfurt, 1957) and K.-H. Jahnke, Entscheidungen. Jugend im Widerstand 1933–1945 (Frankfurt, 1970). Also H. W. Koch, The Hitler Youth: Origins and Development 1922–1945 (London, 1975), Chapter 10.
P. Hüttenberger, ‘Vorüberlegungen zum “Widerstandsbegriff”, in Theorien in der Praxis des Historikers, ed. Jürgen Kocka (Geschichte und Gesellschaft, Sonderheft, 1977).
See also in detail K.-J. Müller, Armee und Drittes Reich. Versuch einer historischen Interpretation (Stuttgart, 1969).
See Manfred Messerschmidt, ‘Werden und Prägung des deutschen Offizierkorps’, in Offiziere im Bild von Dokumenten aus drei Jahrhunderten (Stuttgart, 1964), as well as Karl Demeter, Das deutsche Offizierkorps in Gesellschaft und Staat 1650–1945 (Frankfurt, 1964, revised and extended ed. 1965), available also in an English translation, The German Officer Corps.
On this interpretational assessment of the structure of the Prussian-German Empire see Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Das Deutsche Kaiserreich 1871–1918 (Göttingen 1973, 1975), and the important reviews on it by Thomas Nipperdey, ‘Wehler’s “Kaiserreich’. Eine kritische Auseinandersetzung’, in Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 1 (1975), 539–60, as well as by Hans-Günter Zmarzlik, ‘Das Kaiserreich in neuer Sicht?’, in Historische Zeitschrift, 222 (1976), 105–26. See also the counter-critique in H. W. Koch, A Constitutional History of Germany in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (London, 1984) pp. 236ff and D. Calleo, The German Problem Reconsidered (Cambridge, 1980).
On this and on the following, see Theodor Schieder, Das deutsche Kaiserreich von 1871 als Nationalstaat (Cologne and Opladen, 1961).
In general, on this see the omnibus volumes: Reichsgründung 1870/71. Tatsachen, Kontoversen, Interpretationen, ed. by Th. Schieder and Ernst Deuerlein (Stuttgart, 1970), and Das kaiserliche Deutschland. Politik und Gesellschaft 1870–1918, ed. by Michael Stürmer (Düsseldorf, 1970). Also R. Dahrendorf, Democracy and Society in Germany (London, 1969) and H. W. Koch, A History of Prussia (London, 1978).
Apart from the literature mentioned in note 8 above, see M. Messerschmidt, Militär und Politik in der Bismarckzeit und im wilhelminischen Deutschland (Darmstadt, 1975) as well as Martin Kitchen, The German Officer Corps, 1890–1914 (Oxford, 1973).
See ‘Die politsche Geschichte der preussisch-deutschen Armee,’ in Handbuch zur deutschen Militärgeschichte, ed. for the Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt by O. Hackl and M. Messerschmidt, Vol. 2 (Munich, 1975).
On this point see the fundamental works of M. Geyer, especially: Aufrüstung oder Sicherheit. Reichswehr und die Krise der Machtpolitik 1924–1936 (Wiesbaden, 1980), and his, ‘Der zur Organisation erhobene Burgfrieden’, in K.-J. Müller and Eckhardt Opitz (eds), Militär und Militarismus in der Weimarer Republik (Düsseldorf, 1978), pp. 15–100. In these works Geyer develops a comprehensive interpretative and inter-related framework, the basic essence of which is the idea of the ‘industrialisation of war’, the ‘delimitising of the use of (military) force’ and the’ socialisation of war’ together with the more general’ socialisation of danger’. This central idea of Geyer’s, of the ‘industrialisation of war’, in my opinion, puts too little emphasis on the importance of the ever-constant socio-politically structured traditions of the Prussio-German state and of its officer corps. In addition, it appears to me, on the subject of the industrialisation phenomenon, that too little consideration has been paid to the immense importance of the new technology for the military. I would therefore prefer the term ‘technical-industrial war’. Excellent on the historical dimension is Michael Howard, War in European History (London, Oxford, New York, 1976).
The objective of the restoration of Germany as a great power had already been clearly expressed during the well-known meeting of leading officers of the general staff on 20 December 1918 in Berlin, at which both Seeckt and Schleicher appeared as main speakers: see the description in Francis L. Carsten, Reichswehr and Politics 1918–1933 (Oxford, 1966).
See Müller, Armee und Drittes Reich cited in note 7 above.
Hans Meier-Welcker, Seeckt (Frankfurt, 1967), particularly chapters x-xii and xvii; in addition see Carl Guske, Das politische Denken des General v. Seeckt. Ein Beitrag zur Diskussion des Verhältnisses Seeckt-Reichswehr-Republik, Lübeck (Hamburg, 1971), H. J. Gordon Jr, The Reichswehr and the German Republic 1919–1926 (Princeton, 1957); H. W. Koch, Der Deutsche Bürgerkrieg 1918–1924 (Berlin, 1978).
See A. Schildt, Militärdiktatur mit Massenbasis? Die Querfrontkonzeption der Reichswehrführung um General von Schleicher am Ende der Weimarer Republik (Frankfurt/ New York, 1981); D. Groener-Geyer, General Groener, Soldat und Staatsmann (Frankfurt, 1955); F.-K. v. Plehwe Reichskanzler Kurt v. Schleidner (Esslingen, 1983).
See M. Messerschmidt, Die Wehrmacht im NS-Staat. Zeit der Indoktrination (Hamburg, 1969), passim.
Quoted from R. A. Blasius, Für Grossdeutschland — gegen den grossen Krieg. Ernst v. Weizsäcker in den Krisen über die Tschechoslowakei und Polen (Cologne/Vienna, 1981), p. 24 (also the relevant literature cited there on E. v. Weizsäcker).
Ernst v. Weizsäcker, Die Weizsäcker-Papiere, ed. by L. E. Hill (Berlin, 1974).
Hüttenberger, ‘Vorüberlegungen zum “Widerstandsbegriff”, p. 133.
On the Röhm affair see K.-J. Müller, Das Heer und Hitler. Armee und nationalsozialistisches Régime 1933–1940 (Stuttgart, 1969), Chapter III, as well as his, ‘Reichswehr und “Röhm-Affare”, in Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen (in future referred to as MGM) 3 (1968), 107–44 and Ch. Bloch, Die SA und die Krise des NS-Regimes 1934 (Frankfurt, 1970).
On this point see Blasius, Für Grossdeutschland, passim and the literature mentioned there.
Ibid., pp. 120, 121, 125. See special emissary Henderson’s letter to Lord Halifax of 21 August 1939, about Weizsäcker’s suggestion that General Ironside should send a warning letter from the British prime minister to Hitler: ‘His visit might at least help to discredit Ribbentrop’, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939, ed., by E. L. Woodward and R. Butler (London, 1946) (in future abbreviated to DBFP), 3rd series, vol. VII, No. 117, p. 109.
See K.-J. Müller, Das Heer und Hitler (Stuttgart, 1969), Chapter iv, ‘Blomberg-Skandal und Fritsch-Krise’, as well as H. C. Deutsch, Das Komplott oder die Entmachtung der Generale. Blomber-und Fritsch-Krise. Hitlers Weg zum Krieg (Zürich, 1974).
B. Scheurig, Henning von Tresckow. Eine Biographie (Hamburg, 1973, 1980). H. Graml, ‘Der Fall Oster,’ in Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte (Munich, 1966), pp. 26–39. General Beck noted at the time his impression that the Fritsch case ‘had opened a chasm between Hitler and the officer corps, especially in respect of mutual trust, which could never again be bridged’, Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv (in future abbreviated to BA-MA) no. 28/3, sheet 43–5, note of 29 July 1938; cf. H. Höhne, Canaris, Patriot im Zwielicht (Munich, 1976).
See G. Ritter, Carl Goerdeler und die deutsche Widerstandsbewegung (Stuttgart, 1956).
B. Scheurig, Henning von Tresckow. Eine Biographie (Hamburg, 1973).
See on this point, Müller, Heer und Hitler, Chapter vi and viii, as well as P. Hoffmann, Widerstand, Staatsstreich, Attentat. Der Kampf der Opposition gegen Hitler (Munich, 1979), Chapter iv.
On this, see especially Höhne, Canaris, Chapter 8. along with the most recent literature.
With reference to the inter-connections of personnel, especially informative is: Hoffmann, Widerstand, Chapter ii; the quotation is from there, p. 52.
See Müller, Heer und Hitler, pp. 232ff.
See G. Ritter, Carl Goerdeler und die deutsche Widerstandsbewegung (Stuttgart, 1956), pp. 154ff., 167f. Goerdeler sent his tour reports among other things to Göring and Schacht as well as to the Reichskanzlei (Wiedemann).
British reactions to Goerdeler’s information and the assessment of his reports are described in detail by S. Aster, 1939: The Making of the Second World War (London, 1973), especially pp. 43ff., 45–9, 57, 230ff., 345, 362.
See on this and on the following, Deutsch, Das Komplott, as well as the relevant chapters in Hoffmann, Widerstand (Chapter iii) and Müller, Heer und Hitler (Chapter vi). For Canaris see Höhne, Canaris, pp. 244ff.
The background to which these developments took place was the increasingly critical attitude which prevailed in sections of the national-conservative milieu, who were disappointed with the development of the regime. The rapidly spreading dissatisfaction in these circles, which had helped in 1933 to carry the ‘national rebirth’ as far as possible, is however, in no way to be labelled ‘opposition’. At best it was the root-base for a possible formation of such opposition, but nothing more, even if many of these disappointed national-conservatives were inclined to profess themselves to be an ‘opposition’, especially when describing to counterparts abroad the whole mood of their circles, even though completely misunderstanding the true nature of the existing power relationships, (see as example, the comments of Koerber to Mason MacFarlane, DBFP, 3rd series, vol. ii, no. 595, p. 65.). Beck, Canaris and Hossbach, on the other hand, were completely free of such illusions at this time.
On Canaris see Höhne, Chapter 8; on Hossbach see Deutsch, Das Komplott, and on Beck see Müller, Heer und Hitler, pp. 262, 267ff., 281–98, as well as Müller, Ludwig Beck, Studien und Dokumente zur politisch-militärischen Vorstellungswelt und Tätigkeit des Generalstabschefs des deutschen Heeres 1933–1938 (Boppard, 1980), Chapter iii.
Printed in Müller, Heer und Hitler, document no. 34. Especially informative on the nature of the power struggle, there is the formula, ‘the setting-free of the Wehrmacht’ (therefore not primarily the nation!).
On this and on the following see H. K. G. Roennefarth, Die Sudetenkrise in der internationalen Politik, Entstehung, Verlauf, Auswirkung, vol. 2 (Wiesbaden, 1961); as well as Müller, Ludwig Beck, Chapter v and vi, and R. A. Blasius, Grossdeutschland, passim (along with the most recent literature). Also K. G. Robbins, Munich (London, 1978) and E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis (London, 1939), first edition only.
This suggests mainly the work by Hoffmann, Widerstand.
For this and for the following, in detail, see Müller, Ludwig Beck; a synopsis of the findings in this book in Müller, Armee, Politik und Gesellschaft (cited in n. 2 above), the paragraph headed ‘Generaloberst Ludwig Beck. Generalstabchef des deutschen Heeres 1933–1938. Einige Reflektionen und neuere Forschungsergebnisse’, pp. 51–100.
See G. R. Ueberschär, ‘Generaloberst Halder im militärischen Widerstand 1938–1940’, in Wehrforschung, I (1973), H. I, 20–31.
See, in addition, Höhne, Canaris, passim.
See Blasius, Grossdeutschland.
See, on this point, Weizsäcker’s similar thoughts in a note of February 1939 (Die Weizsäcker-Papiere).
Printed as documents 31 and 43 in Müller, Ludwig Beck.
Ibid., document no. 46, notes of 29 May 1938.
Official documents — Akten zur Deutschen Auswärtigen Politik 1918–1945 (in future abbreviated as ADAP), D, vol. i, no. 21 and Weizsäcker-Papiere, p. 126: entry of 19 April 1938.
Müller, Ludwig Beck, document no. 55.
Blasius, Grossdeutschland, Chapter 2, paragraph i, especially pp. 41ff.
Ibid., p. 49.
Weizsäcker-Papiere, p. 168: ‘Ribbentrop took complete charge, therefore, of the Czech issue’. See also ibid., p. 145 (note of 9 October 1938), where Weizsäcker, thinking back to the Godesberg talks with Chamberlain, writes: ‘The group which wanted war, namely Ribbentrop and the SS, would nearly have been successful after all in causing the Führer to hit out’.
Thus, in contrast to the majority of relevant investigations, Hoffmann, Widerstand, pp. 104ff. and 685f. (See there, also, the relevant literature.)
Thus, the great majority of literature assimilated in formulae used by W. Foerster, Generaloberst Ludwig Beck. Sein Kampf gegen den Krieg (Munich, 1953).
See Höhne, Canaris, pp. 284ff.
See Blasius, Grossdeutschland, pp. 51ff.
The memoranda and notes, often quoted in this connection, of high-ranking naval officers (Guse, Heye) from July 1938, in which warnings of the risk of war appeared, have been overrated, as more recent investigations have shown, thus H. Krausnick, ‘Vorgeschichte und Beginn des militärischen Widerstandes gegen Hitler’, in Vollmacht des Gewissens, ed. by the Europäische Publikation e.V., vol. i (Frankfurt, Berlin, 1960), pp. 177–384, here pp. 315ff. — ‘zu unrecht als Widerstandshandlung’ (thus also, M. Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung, 1935–1945, vol. i: 1935–1941 (Frankfurt, 1970), p. 45).
See Beck’s memorandum of 16 July 1938 (printed in Müller, Ludwig Beck, doc. no. 49/50), where it says: ‘the intention of delaying a solution by force of the Czech problem for so long until the military prerequisites for it have been fundamentally changed. At present I consider it hopeless.’
E. v. Weizsäcker, Erinnerungen. Mein Leben, ed. by R. v. Weizsäcker (Munich, Leipzig, Freiburg, 1950) recorded a very carefully worded passage in which he indicated that he was in fact never a member of a subversionary group in the foreign office, intent only on the removal/extermination of Hitler, but that he had always acted like a’ supporter’ and, since summer 1938, had always advocated the removal of Hitler. This statement finds no corroboration whatever in the Weizsäcker-Papiere, the cause of which may, nevertheless, have been the peculiarity of conspiratorial behaviour patterns. At any rate, the most recent thorough investigation also comes to the conclusion (Blasius, Grossdeutschland, Chapter 3), that no participation by Weizsäcker in the subversion plans was evident.
See on this point, G. Schreiber, Revisionismus und Weltmachtstreben. Marinefürung und deutsch-italienische Beziehungen 1919 bis 1944 (Stuttgart, 1978), Chapter iii, as well as his, ‘Zur Kontinuität des Grossund Weltmachtstrebens der deutschen Marineführung,’ in MGM, 2 (1979), 101–72.
Verification for this in Müller, Ludwig Beck, Chapter iv; on the assessment of enemy disposition with special reference to France see also the situation appraisal in H. Speidel, Aus unserer Zeit, Erinnerungen (Frankfurt, Berlin, Vienna, 1977), pp. 431–53: ‘Französischer Sicherheitsbegriff und französische Führung’; the particulars of the manoeuvres undertaken by the General Staff for the most part in BA-MA Wi/IF 5.1502.
See note 53 above.
Thus in Weizsäcker-Papiere, p. 128 (22 May 1938: ‘Wir bluffen’) and pp. 131f. (Dangers of a bluff-policy) as well as in the Rückblick — in retrospect (9 October 1938), p. 145 (‘The supposition is therefore incorrect that the Führer had been intent on a huge bluff taken to extreme degrees.’)
On these diplomatic steps and activities see B. Scheurig, Ewald v. Kleist-Schmenzin. Ein Konservativer gegen Hitler (Oldenburg and Hamburg, 1968), pp. 155ff.; Krausnick, Vorgeschichte, pp. 307, 330f., 340f: Roennefarth, Sudetenkrise, vol. i, Chapter 8; H. Groscurth, Tagebücher eines Abwehroffiziers 1938–1940, with further documents on the military opposition to Hitler, ed. by H. Krausnick, H. Deutsch and H. v. Kotze (Stuttgart, 1970), p. 102; E. Kordt, Nicht aus den Akten... (Not from the official documents...) Die Wilhelmstrasse in Frieden und Krieg, Erlebnisse, Begegnungen und Eindrücke 1928–1945 (Stuttgart, 1950), pp. 228ff.; Höhne, Canaris, pp. 287ff.; Weizsäcker-Papiere, pp. 142f.
See Blasius, Grossdeutschland, pp. 60f.
See Weizsäcker-Papiere p. 169: ‘A committed opponent of the war was the Chief of the General Staff Beck. He told me at the beginning of August that he was leaving, because he did not wish to bear any part of the responsibility for the evil to come. To my attempts to change his mind, he answered by saying that, at the moment of crisis a soldier could not leave and, therefore, he should do it beforehand. As for myself, he felt I could stay, since the politician, as opposed to the soldier, had various possibilities to turn away, right up to the end (note of mid-October 1939).
On the role of the brothers Theo and Erich Kordt in the foreign office, about the circle around these two and their contacts with other oppositionists see Blasius, Grossdeutschland, pp. 55f., 141ff. (with corresponding sources and literature).
On this point, see S. Aster, Second World War, 1939 (London, 1973), as well as B.-J. Wendt, München 1938. England zwischen Hitler und Preussen (Frankfurt, 1965).
On this, see the works of Aster, Second World War; J. Henke, England in Hitlers politischem Kalkül 1935–1939 (Boppard, 1973); W. Michalka, Ribbentrop und die deutsche Weltpolitik, 1939–1940. Aussenpolitische Konzeptionen und Entscheidungsprozesse im Dritten reich (Munich, 1980) as well as Weizsäcker-Papiere. In the relevant literature there is still too little distinction between official, semi-official and conspiratorial contacts abroad. See also the recent essay by Oswald Hauser, ‘England und der deutsche Widerstand im Spiegel britischer Akten’, in Weltpolitik, Europagedanke, Regionalismus. Festschrift für Heinz Gollwitzer zum 65. Geburtstag, ed. by Heinz Dollinger, Horst Gründer and Alwin Hanschmidt (Münster, 1982).
Blasius, Grossdeutschland, pp. 51ff. attempts an analytical distinction in ‘Einflussnahme auf dem Dienstweg’, ‘Einwirkungen von innen’ und ‘Beeinflussung von aussen’; then, however, he adopts (p. 57) Weizsäckers own post-war formulations to describe the Henderson-Weizsäcker talks: ‘Conspiracy with the potential opponent for the purpose of securing peace’ (Weizsäcker, Erinnerungen, p. 178). Here, the expression ‘conspiracy’ is certainly inappropriate as one could sooner express it as ‘personal diplomacy’ or, at most, ‘counter-diplomacy’ on the part of the state secretary, or as ‘opposition by means of departmental opportunity’.
There is a detailed description of the development in Hoffmann, Widerstand, Chapter iv/4 as well as a thorough analysis in Müller, Heer und Hitler, Chapter viii (‘Die September-Verschwörung’).
Politically important in this was the feeling between Haider and Schacht, as well as the somewhat looser contacts with Goerdeler, which functioned via Gisevius; technically valuable were the relations with Police-President Helldorff and his deputy Schulenburg; the group around F. W. Heinz had some loose contacts with a few former trade unionists (Leuschner).
Details about Oster’s plans in Hoffmann, Widerstand, pp. 118ff and Müller, Heer und Hitler, p. 369. Attention is drawn, in addition, to the fact that the main source on which the relevant investigations are based is exceptionally narrow and qualitatively very bad. It is a question, exclusively, of statements after the event.
Brauchitsch was apparently brought into the anti-war activities by Haider and Witzleben during the crisis of the German-British talks of 26–29 September; it remains uncertain whether he was informed about the planned course of action. Weizsäcker, on the other hand, refused to support the overthrow of Hitler as being too risky at the time, though he, nevertheless, was in touch with the conspirators; see Blasius, Grossdeutschland, p. 160.
See the wording in Goerdeler’s letter of 11 October 1938 in Ritter, Goerdeler, p. 198 and the diary notes in U. v. Hasseil, Vom anderen Deutschland. Aus den nachgelassenen Tagebüchern 1938–1944 (Zürich-Freiburg, 1946), p. 18; cf. also Weizsäcker’s remark to Canaris: ‘An internal action would be impossible if there were no Führer present and the people had got used to living in a Napoleonic age’ (Groscurth, Tagebücher, p. 159, entry of 14 December 1938).
Not until 24 September were the conspirators successful in obtaining a groundplan of the Reichskanzlei which was necessary for the assault troops (Kordt, Niche aus den Akten, p. 263); Haider complained that Witzleben had not taken enough trouble with details of the planning (Ritter, Goerdeler, p. 479, n. 75). Cf. also Müller, Heer und Hitler, pp. 360, 375.
There is a synopsis of all relevant research in Hoffmann, Widerstand, Chapter iv, paras 1 and 2, as well as in, with a different evaluation, Müller, Heer und Hitler, Chapter ix.
See, for example, the entry by Hassell (Vom anderen Deutschland, p. 59) in his diary, 7 August 1939, on information from a confidant in the foreign office: ‘Ribbentrop is behaving like a madman... Göring still appears to be the most sensible one there, but does not want... to be accused of being a coward again. There can be no hope among the Generals. Of Keitel there can be no doubt, but Brauchitsch also now completely in the hands of the Party. Few kept a cool head: Haider, Canaris, Thomas.’
On this point see Müller, Heer und Hitler, Chapter ix, specifically pp. 399–405.
See the critical appraisal of one of those involved: H. B. Gisevius, Bis zum bitteren Ende. Vom Reichstagsbrand bis zum 20. Juli 1944 (Sonderausgabe) (Hamburg, 1964), pp. 403f. Even the occupation of the rest of Czechoslovakia — as Beck maintained — was no great rousing event (ibid., p. 389).
After great difficulties a meeting was arranged between Beck and Halder which ended in discord. It is true that both men agreed absolutely on the appraisal of the situation, but Haider considered a state coup in the present situation to be hopeless, since the right moment had not yet been reached. Beck departed deeply disappointed from his successor (see Müller, Heer und Hitler, pp. 395f. and Ueberschär, Halder, pp. 24f).
The only diplomatic steps which were not initiated by Weizsäcker and which were not checked over with him as to their central issues, were those undertaken by the Kordt brothers in London in June 1939; along with other approaches to the British government, to persuade it to issue a clear warning to Hitler in order to prevent him from declaring war, these were meant to initiate a public British declaration against Hitler’s war policy, which in turn would be the key factor in the overthrow of the regime (see on this point, the supporting evidence and critical analysis in Blasius, Grossdeutschland, pp. 141ff.). There could be here a tentative point of contact between the anti-war policy and certain aspects of the plans for a coup at that time; at any rate, in view of the existing disparity of the radical opposition, one fails to see how and by whom, as a result of a public British declaration, a coup of this kind was supposed to have been carried out in Germany. As recognisably as the diplomatic steps taken by the Kordts in London are supported with evidence, so equally unrecognisable is any concrete proof of a planned coup or even any relevant preparations.
See Müller, Heer und Hitler, Chapter ix, as well as Höhne, Canaris, pp. 318f., 329f. Moreover, Keitel seems, for a time, really to have tried to persuade Hitler to avoid war: W. Görlitz (ed.), Generalfeldmarschall Keitel, Verbrecher oder Offizier? Erinnerungen, Briefe, Dokumente des Chefs OKW (Göttingen, Berlin, Frankfurt, 1961), p. 208.
On this point, see Weizsäcker’s retrospective report of October 1939, Weizsäcker-Papiere, p. 172, as well as Michalka, Ribbentrop, Chapter iv and Blasius, Grossdeutschland, pp. 92ff., 117ff., as well as Henke, England, Chapter in.
Thus Blasius, Grossdeutschland, p. 91.
For the British side see S. Aster, Second World War. Further, see Hoffmann, Widerstand, pp. 138ff.
See Höhne, Canaris, Chapter 9.
The best known example is the text of Hitler’s speech of 22 August 1939, doctored up for the purpose, which was then played to the British: see Müller, Heer und Hitler, pp. 409–13; H. W. Koch, ‘The Origins of the Second World War: Second Thoughts on the Status of some Documents’, in Historical Journal, (1968).
Blasius, Grossdeutschland, p. 162.
Ibid., pp. 98ff.
See the résumé of the analysis by Blasius, Grossdeutschland, p. 162: Weizsäcker, ‘it is true, despised the Nazi regime, but, because of his attitude during the crises concerning Czechoslovakia and Poland is not to be considered as a “man of resistance” against Hitler. Weizsäcker was counting on the common sense of the Führer, and, in order to influence the Führer’s decisions, he thought it necessary to wrestle with the “war-monger” Ribbentrop.’
Quotation from Aster, Second World War, pp. 230f.
Gisevius, Bis zum bitteren Ende, pp. 403f.
This is shown most impressively by the findings evaluated in Aster, Second World War. In addition, the British also had dealings to attend to with Hitler’s officiai emissaries, who came to London outside the normal diplomatic channels, such as Wiedemann, Reichenau, etc.
For example, Schwerin suggested to the British that they should send a part of the fleet into the Baltic as a demonstration, while, at the same time, Weizsäcker was busy persuading Hitler, by reason of détente, not to send a German fleet to Danzig. (On the Schwerin mission: Aster, Second World War, pp. 235, 237f.)
Weizsäcker-Papiere, p. 163 (31 August 1939).
On Canaris see Höhne, Canaris, pp. 302f., 320ff., as well as Groscurth, Tagebücher, pp. 171, 173 (‘The great Reichstag speech of the Führer now sets in motion our work against Poland. That is good and is about time, too.’) and pp. 178ff.; on Weizsäcker see Weizsäcker-Papiere, pp. 150ff., 175f. (quotation p. 157, entry of 30 July 1939); on Haider: see in Müller, Heer und Hitler, pp. 545f, 567 the supporting proof of Haider’s innate anglophobia and his essential agreement on the need for a settlement of the question of the eastern borders; on 15 October 1965 Haider wrote to the author: ‘That England was, in fact, the key protagonist in the struggle between the western powers and Germany, I have never doubted.’
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Müller, KJ. (1985). The Structure and Nature of the National Conservative Opposition in Germany up to 1940. In: Koch, H.W. (eds) Aspects of the Third Reich. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-17891-9_5
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Print ISBN: 978-0-333-35273-1
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-17891-9
eBook Packages: Palgrave History CollectionHistory (R0)