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Aspects of the Third Reich pp 39–61Cite as

1933: The Legality of Hitler’s Assumption of Power

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Abstract

Historians are the greatest enemies of conspiracy theories, but paradoxically they also invent them. This applies with a vengeance to the events leading to Hitler’s appointment as German chancellor by Reich president von Hindenburg on 30 January 1933, which, especially in Germany’s contemporary historiography, is often described as the result of a conspiracy between Hindenburg, his advisers, the conservatives, the army and German industrialists.1

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Notes and References

  1. Purely Marxist interpretations apart see K. D. Bracher, Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republik (Villingen, 1960), Chapter xi; K. D. Bracher, W. Sauer and G. Schulz, Die nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung (Cologne, 1960), Chapter 1; A. Bullock, Hitler: a study in tyranny (London, 1962), p. 253 and, though devoid of scholarly value but still widely read, W. L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (London, 1960), pp. 181ff.

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  2. See for example the 1928 SPD election film Was wählst Du? or Der Deutschen Volke held by Bundesarchiv Koblenz.

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  3. Protokoll. Sozialdemokratischer Parteitag Magdeburg 1929 (Berlin, 1929), p. 67.

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  4. Ibid., p. 170.

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  5. See the call by Schulrat Runkel (DVP) and his call to put the nation before party political interests in Kölnische Zeitung, 11 March 1930.

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  6. See Heinrich Brüning, Memoiren (Munich, 1972), p. 170; E. Forsthoff, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte der Neuzeit (Stuttgart, 1961), p. 189; Reichtagsprotokolle, 16 July 1930, p. 6407; H. Heiber, Die Republik von Weimar (Munich, 1966), p. 225; W. Hubatsch, Hindenburg und der Staat (Göttingen, 1966), passim., see also Times Literary Supplement review of this work, 12 May 1966.

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  7. H. W. Koch, A Constitutional History of Germany in the 19th and 20th Centuries (London, 1984), p. 269.

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  8. Bundesarchiv Koblenz (BAKO) R43/I No. 1870 Verfassungsrechtliches Gutachten von Prof. Dr. Carl Schmitt über die Frage, ob der Reichspräsident befugt ist, auf Grund von Art. 48, Abs. 2, RV finanzgesetzvertretende Verordnungen zu erlassen, July 1930; Carl Schmitt, Die Diktatur des Reichspräsidenten nach Art. 48 der Reichsverfassung. Veröffentlichung der Vereinigung Deutscher Staatsrechtslehrer, (Berlin, 1924), pp. 72f.; ibid., ‘Legalität und Legitimität’, first published in 1932 and now contained in Verfassungsrechtliche Aufsätze aus den Jahren 1924–1954. Materalien zu einer Verfassungslehre (Berlin, 1958), pp. 263f. See also p. 345 and his warnings about the potential misuse of Article 76 of the Weimar Constitution.

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  9. Brüning, Memoiren, p. 192.

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  10. See E. Eyck, Geschichte der Weimarer Republik (Zürich, 1956), vol. II, p. 350; see also the leading article of the liberal Frankfurter Zeitung, 15 September 1930.

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  11. See G. Stoltenberg, Politische Strömungen im schleswig-holsteinischem Landvolk 1918–1933 (Düsseldorf, 1962), passim.

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  12. D. Orlow, The History of the Nazi Party 1919–1933 (Newton Abott, 1969), pp.177ff.

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  13. Ibid., Chapters 4 and 5.

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  14. P. H. Merkl, Political Violence under the Swastika (Princeton, 1975), pp. 33, 469.

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  15. H. H. Hofmann, Der Hitlerputsch. Krisenjahre deutscher Geschichte 1920–1924 (Munich, 1961), passim; Bullock, Hitler, pp. 130, 166ff., 222ff.

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  16. P. Bucher, Der Reichswehrprocess. Der Hochverrat der Ulmer Reichswehroffiziere 1929/30 (Boppard/Rgein, 1967’, pp. 24ff.

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  17. Ibid., pp. 237ff.

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  18. Völkischer Beobachter, Munich, 11 September 1930.

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  19. BAKO Film Archive, Reichskanzler Adolf Hitler spricht/

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  20. That is to say, Carl Schmitt clearly recognised this danger: ’As soon as the presupposition of a mutually accepted legal basis is no longer accepted, there is no longer any way out:... The opposition party, once it gains power by legal means, will use everything in its power to entrench itself within this power, to close the door behind it in order to remove the principle of legality by legal means.’ (Schmitt’s italics) in Legalität und Legitimität, cited in n. 8 above.

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  21. See W. J. Helbich, Die Reparationen in der Ära Brüning. Zur Bedeuting des Young-Planes für die deutsche Politik 1930–1932 (Berlin, 1962), passim.

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  22. Brüning in Vossische Zeitung, Berlin, 8 December 1931.

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  23. In Zentrum, April 1931, pp. 64ff.; see also Konjunkturstatistisches Handbuch 1933 (Berlin, 1933), p. 116.

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  24. Konjunkturstatistisches Handbuch, op. cit., pp. 76–9; BAKO R43 I/1446 Drucksache des vorläufigen Reichswirtschaftsrates, 12 August 1930.

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  25. Schulthess’ Europäischer Geschtskalender, ed. U. Thuerauf (Munich, 1932), p. 10; Richtlinien der Reichszentrale für Heimatdienst, No. 217, ‘Das Weltwirtschaftsmoratorium und seine Bedeutung’, Berlin, July 1931, also No. 219, ‘Wirtschaftskrise und öffentliche Finanzen’, Berlin, Sept. 1931; No. 220, ‘Die dritte Notverordnung vom 6. Oktober 1931’, Berlin, Oct. 1931; ‘Die öffentlichen Ausgaben und ihre Sekung’, Berlin, Nov. 1931; C. Goerdeler, ‘Preisüberwachung’ in Heimatdienst, 1 Jan. 1932.

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  26. See n. 24 above, pp. 497f.

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  27. See Jacques Doriot on 13 Nov. 1930 in the Chamber of Deputies in Journal de la République Française, Débates Parlementaires, Chambre des Députés, (Paris, 1930), p. 3362; Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939, 2nd Series, vol. II, Wiggin Report, Appendix II, pp. 492f.

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  28. In winter 1930/31 reaching almost 5 million: Wirtschaft und Statistik (Berlin, 1933), p. 19.

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  29. That Hindenburg, true to his military ethos, tried to stand above parties and politics is confirmed by such different historians as J. Wheeler-Bennet, The Wooden Titan (London, 1936), W. Hubatsch, Hindenburg und der Staat, and H. Heiber, Die Republik von Weimar. It is also the message he conveys clearly in the re-election film made in 1932 for the presidential elections (held in BAKO Film Archive). He was all the more bitter when as a result of his victory he was drawn in to the cauldron of centre-to-moderate left party politics, for which he blamed Brüning, in addition to which came the fact that even after two years Brüning was unable to govern constitutionally.

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  30. For new background on Brüning’s resignation see F.-K. v. Plehwe, Reichskanzler Kurt von Schleicher (Esslingen, 1983), pp. 184ff.

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  31. Ibid.; also F. v. Papen, Memoirs (London, 1952), pp. 153, 161.

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  32. Letter by Legationsrat Kurt v. Lersner, 20 May 1932 to Schleicher, cited in Ch. Barber, Wehrmachtsabteilung and Ministeramt, PhD thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1971, p. 372.

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  33. On Papen’s constitutional schemes see his Memoirs, pp. 152, 163, 166–9, 253.

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  34. O. Meissner, Staatssekretär unter Ebert, Hindenburg und Hitler (Hamburg, 1950), pp. 245ff.; Th. Vogelsang, ‘Zur Politik Schleichers gegenüber der NSDAP 1932’ in Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte ‘VfZg’ (Munich, 1958), pp. 105f.

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  35. See Bracher, Auflösung, pp. 647f.; more recently V. Hentschel, Weimars letzte Monate (Düsseldorf, 1978), p. 17.

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  36. So Bracher in Auflösung, also his Die nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung and Die Deutsche Diktatur (Cologne, 1969), passim.

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  37. See C. L. Mowatt, Britain between the Wars (London, 1961), passim, and W. E. Leuchtenburg, F.D.R. and the New Deal (New York, 1963), passim.

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  38. Plehwe, Reichskanzler Kurt von Schleicher, p. 258; E. Matthias and E. Morseu (eds), Das Ende der Parteien (Düsseldorf, 1960), p. 176.

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  39. A. Werner, SA und NSDAP. Studien zur Geschichte der SA und der NSDAP 1920–1933, PhD Dissertation, University Belangen-Nürnberg 1954, pp. 548f.

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  40. Apart from Bracher, Auflösung, see Orlow, History of the Nazi Party, pp. 286ff. and W. Horn, Führerideologic und Parteiorganisation in der NSDAP (Düsseldorf, 1972), pp. 369f.

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  41. On the Tat-Kreis see K. V. Klemperer, Germany’s New Conservatism (Princeton, 1957), pp. 117ff.; J. Petzold, Wegbereiter des deutschen Faschismus: Die Jungkonservativen in der Weimarer Republik (Berlin, 1978), pp. 273ff.

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  42. A. Mohler, Von Rechts gesehen (Stuttgart, 1975), p. 25.

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  43. Already, during the last phase of Brüning’s government, the Centre Party had issued a communiqué rejecting ‘the temporary solution provided by the present cabinet, and demands that the situation should be clarified by placing the responsibility for forming a government into the hands of the National Socialist Party’, quoted by Papen, Memoirs, p. 161. As late as 26 January 1933 Prelate Kaas addressed a letter to Hindenburg demanding a return to a constitutionally legal majority government, which, of course, could only be formed with but not against the National Socialists, quoted in Forsthoff, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte, p. 192.

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  44. For this conversation see F. L. Carsten, The Reichswehr and Politics 1918–1933 (Oxford, 1966), pp. 391f.

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  45. Bracher, Auflösung, p. 713.

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  46. Institut für Zeitgeschichte, Munich, ZS No. 279, p. 18, Aufzeichnungen von E. Ott.; Plehwe, Reichskanzler Kurt von Schleicher, p. 282; Dr H. Picker, Hitler’s Tischgespräche im Füherhauptquartier (Stuttgart, 1976), entry 21 May 1942, p. 326.

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  47. Hugenberg to the leader of the ex-servicemen’s organisation Stahlhelm in Th. Duesterberg, Der Stahlhelm und Hitler (Wolfbüttel, 1949), p. 38; to the conservative Ewald v. Kleist-Schmenzim (later to be executed because of his participation in the 1944 July bomb plot against Hitler) Papen said, ‘I have got Hindenburg’s confidence. In two months’ time we will have squeezed Hitler into a corner till he squeaks’, cited in E. v. Kleist Schmenzin, ‘Die letzte Möglichkeit’, Politische Studien (1959), 89f.

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  48. See H. Bennecke, Hitler und die SA (Munich, 1963), p. 211; see also n. 39 above.

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  49. J. Goebbels, Vom Kaiserhof zur Reichskanzlei (Munich, 1938), pp. 190ff.

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  50. See the following by Henry Ashby Turner, Jr, ‘Big Business and the Rise of Hitler’, American Historical Review (1969), 56f, ‘Hitler’s Secret Pamphlet for Industrialists’, Journal of Modern History (1968), 348ff., ‘Emil Kirdorf and the Nazi Party’, Central European History (1968), 324f, ‘The Ruhrlande. Secret Cabinet of Heavy Industry in the Weimar Republic’, Central European History (1970), 195f., ‘Fritz Thussen und das Buch T paid Hitler’, VfZg (1971), 275f., ‘Grossunternehmertum und Nationalsozialismus 1930–1933’, Historische Zeitschrift (1975), 19f. For a restatement of the Marxist ‘agent theory’ see E. Czichon, Wer verhalf Hitler zur Macht? Zum Anteil der Industrie an der Zerstörung der Weimarer Republik (Cologne, 1967).

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  51. See H. Mommsen’s contribution to this volume. F. Tobias, Der Reichstagsbrand (Rastatt, 1962).

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  52. Apart from being periodically prohibited from speaking in various parts of Germany, Hitler and the NSDAP had no access to the new medium of broadcasting, as had the other established Weimar parties. This in turn led to a massive schedule of addressing public meetings, and the availability of chartering a Lufthansa aircraft proved a way out of this serious dilemma. ‘Modernity’ was discovered as it were by accident and with it the slogan ‘Der Führer über Deutschland’.

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  53. See H. Schulze, Otto Braun — oder Preussens demokratische Mission (Berlin, 1981) in which Schulze unwittingly admits that in spite of Brüning’s drastic legislation against transferring capital assets from Germany to countries abroad, Braun must have violated this legislation massively because after Hitler had come to power his (Braun’s) assets allowed him to live comfortably in Switzerland until his death after 1945. See also G. Kotowski, ‘Preussen und die Weimarer Republik’ in Preussen: Epochen und Probleme seiner Geschichte (Berlin, 1964), pp. 145f.

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  54. Estimates range between 380 and 400 fatal casualties including the 16 killed in the November putsch of 1923. Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchive, Abt. I., NS Hauptarchiv 71 999 Zusammenstellung der Blutopfer der NSDAP 1919 bis 1933.

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  55. Tobias, Der Reichstagsbrand, who also reprints the protocols of the cabinet sessions from 30 January until the end of March 1933.

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  56. R. Morsey, ‘Hitler’s Verhandlungen mit der Zentrumsführung am 31. Januar 1931’, VfZg (1961), 182f.; and J. Becker, ‘Zentrum und Ermächtigungsgesetz 1933’, VfZg (1961), 195f.

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  57. M. Domarus (ed.), Hitler: Reden und Proklamationen 1932–1945 (Wiesbaden, 1973), vol. 1, p. 237.

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  58. See Bracher, Sauer and Schulz, Machtergreifung, p. 136. Gleichschaltung was achieved within a few days after the Enabling Act, i.e. ‘Vorläufuges Gesetz zur Gleichschaltung der Länder mit dem Reich’, 31 March 1933, Reichsgesetzblatt (RGBl.) 1, 1933, p. 153; ‘Zweites Gesetz zur Gleichschaltung der Länder mit dem Reich’, 7 April 1933, RGBl, i, 1933, p. 173; ‘Gesetz über die Aufhebung des Reichsrats’, 14 February 1934, RGBl. 1, 1934, p. 89; ‘Reichsstatthaltergesetz’, 30 January 1935, RGBl, 1, 1935, p.65; since March 1933 most German Lands were headed by a new Reich Commissioner or Reichstatthalter under whom the Land governments, staffed in part by NS personnel, continued to operate, but in a purely administrative capacity and subject to the Reich Ministry of the Interior. Thus Bavaria continued to have its prime minister, as did Prussia, whose prime minister was to be Göring.

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  59. ‘Gesetz über das Staatsoberhaupt des Deutschen Reiches’, 1 August 1934, RGBL. 1, 1934.

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  60. Domarus, Hitler, p. 279.

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    H. W. Koch

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Koch, H.W. (1985). 1933: The Legality of Hitler’s Assumption of Power. In: Koch, H.W. (eds) Aspects of the Third Reich. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-17891-9_2

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