Abstract
In the previous chapter we were led to the paradoxical conclusion that the computational theory of mind (CTM) may result in a position that is at once dualistic and behaviourist. Whether it does so or not depends on how dogmatically its proponents interpret the strong AI program (see Chapter 3). If, as Pylyshyn counsels, they abandon their faith in the computational ‘metaphor’ of the mind as a kind of salvation-bringing new paradigm,1 interpret their claims literally (for example, thought as formal symbol manipulation) and then ensure that programs are constrained by empirical validation of their choice of functional architecture and algorithms (that is, that they stay close to the evidence) such consequences may be avoided. But, as I said, it is not at all clear what form these constraints should take.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes and References
For a clear exposition: R. A. Boakes and M. S. Halliday, ‘The Skinnerian analysis of behaviour’, in. R. Borger and F. Cioffi (eds), Explanation in the Behavioural Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).
For a discussion see D. C. Dennett, Brainstorms (Brighton: Harvester, 1979) pp. 122–4.
For example: D. Bobrow ‘Dimensions of representation’, in D. Bobrow and A. Collins (eds), Representation and Understanding (New York: Academic Press, 1975).
H. A. Simon, Models of Thought (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979) pp. 63–4.
For a thorough exposition of this see F. Jacob, The Logic of Living Systems (London: Allen Lane, 1974).
For a similar argument see R. Harris, ‘Discussion’, in: S. C. Brown (ed.) Philosophy of Psychology (London: Macmillan, 1974) pp. 274–6.
Fodor ‘The mind—body problem’, Scientific American Jan. 1981, p. 131.
Fodor, ‘Methodological solipsism’ Behavioural and Brain Sciences 1980, vol. 3.
S. Körner, Kant (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1955) p. 85.
T. Nagel, ‘What it is like to be a bat’, Philosophical Review, 1974, 83, pp. 435–51.
See D. W. Hamlyn, ‘Human learning’ in S. C. Brown (ed.) Philosophy of Psychology (London: Macmillian, 1974).
P. F. Strawson, Individuals (London: Oxford University Press, 1959).
P. L. Berger and T. Luckman, The Social Construction of Reality (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971).
D. W. Hamlyn, ‘Person perception and understanding others’, in T. Mischel (ed.), Understanding Other Persons (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974).
D W Hamlyn, ‘Cognitive systems, folk psychology, and knowledge’, Cognition 1981, 10, pp. 115–18, extract from p. 118.
For example, G. A. Miller, E. Gallanter and K. H. Pribram, Plans and the Structure of Behaviour (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1960).
G. Miller, Comments on Pylyshyn’s paper, The Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 1980, 3, p. 146.
G. Miller, ‘Trends and debates in cognitive psychology’, Cognition 1981, 10, pp. 215–25, extract from p. 222.
H. C. Longuet-Higgins, ‘Artificial intelligence–a new theoretical psychology?’, Cognition, 1981, 3, pp. 197–200.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 1984 James Russell
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Russell, J. (1984). Conditions for Belief and Knowledge. In: Explaining Mental Life. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-17671-7_5
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-17671-7_5
Publisher Name: Palgrave, London
Print ISBN: 978-0-333-34324-1
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-17671-7
eBook Packages: Palgrave Religion & Philosophy CollectionPhilosophy and Religion (R0)