The concept of right, we already hinted, carries elements which allow for two quite distinct senses: one which interlocks with claims both to and against, and a second sense which also affirms one’s claim or right to act in a certain way, yet does so without asserting a duty on the other side or claim against. Such is a right of self-defence, or a right to criticise, or to divorce or separate, or to terminate a contract, or to give notice to a tenant, or the right to compete in trade, or the right to picket.1 We shall call these defensive rights, sometimes called liberties or liberty-rights, to distinguish them from rights with correlative duties or fully assertive rights.
KeywordsMoral Claim Present Danger Justificatory Defence Correlative Duty Distinct Sens
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Notes and References
- 3.D. D. Raphael, ‘Human Rights’, Aristotelian Society Supplement, 39 (1965) pp. 206–7; and see also his Problems of Political Philosophy (London, 1970) pp. 68–70.Google Scholar
- 6.See G. Marshall, ‘Rights, Options and Entitlements’, in A. W. B. Simpson (ed.) Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (1973) pp. 228, 231–2.Google Scholar
- 7.Glanville Williams, ‘The Concept of Liberty’, in R. S. Summers (ed.) Essays in Legal Philosophy (Oxford, 1968) pp. 121, 136ff.Google Scholar