The Abyssinian Crisis, 1935–36

Abstract

Given the priority of containing Nazi German expansionism, there was no incentive in Moscow to exacerbate relations with Italy. On the contrary, despite fundamental ideological differences, Italo-Soviet relations had rarely been anything less than amicable. Indeed, the relationship was frequently cited by the Russians as a prime example of peaceful co-existence between states with different social systems. Furthermore, Hitler’s extensive foreign ambitions threatened Italian and Soviet security alike. The Italians were worried about the fate of Austria; the Russians, about the territorial integrity of Eastern Europe. This gave added reason for the development of active collaboration against a common enemy. At the same time, however, the primacy of Soviet worries about Germany also made Moscow determined to uphold the League of Nations. The problem was that Mussolini’s foreign ambitions drove him into direct conflict with the Covenant. The Soviet Government was therefore faced with an acute dilemma when the Italian Government made clear its intention to conquer Abyssinia.