Abstract
We concluded the last chapter by noting that there is a difference between the prescriptive concerns of many philosophers and the more descriptive and explanatory concerns that underlie the network theory of knowledge. Unfortunately a concern with global prescription that breaches the requirements of impartiality, symmetry, causality and indeed reflexivity is built deeply into many areas of social science. Thus there are many attempts to explain the generation of true knowledge in ways that are different in kind from that which is false. One such area is the analysis of what is called ideology. In fact, however, work on ideology also contains much that is consistent with the requirements of impartiality and symmetry, and is posed in terms of an idiom of social interest that sits comfortably with the network theory. Accordingly, it is important to tease the impartial and the symmetrical from the partial and the asymmetrical and examine the consequences for a theory of knowledge of doing without the notion of ideology at all. We start with the writing of Marx in which, as has often been noted, the concept of ideology achieves its first approximately modern statement.1
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Endnotes
See, for instance, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, Part 1 (Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1970) p. 37.
Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 3 (Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1974) p. 168.
Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1 (Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1974) p. 507.
Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1960) pp. 66–7.
Karl Mannheim, ‘Conservative Thought’ in Karl Mannheim, Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1953) pp. 74–164.
Jorge Larrain, The Concept of Ideology (Hutchinson, London, 1979) p. 118.
Barry Barnes, Interests and the Growth of Knowledge (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1977) p. 38.
Andrew Pickering, ‘The Role of Interests in High Energy Physics: the Choice Between Charm and Colour’, in Karin D. Knorr, Roger Krohn and Richard Whitley (eds), The Social Process of Scientific Investigation, Sociology of the Sciences, vol. 4 (D. Reidel, Dordrecht and Boston, 1980) pp. 107–38.
See, in this context, Bruno Latour and Steven Woolgar, Laboratory Life: the Social Construction of Scientific Facts (Sage, London and Beverly Hills, 1979) Ch. 5;
Trevor Pinch, ‘Theoreticians and the Production of Experimental Anomaly: the Case of Solar Neutrinos’, in Karin D. Knorr, Roger Krohn and Richard D. Whitley (eds), Social Process, pp. 77–106; and Rob Williams and John Law, ‘Beyond the Bounds of Credibility’, Fundamenta Scientiae, 1 (1980) pp. 295–315.
Barnes’ suggestion that a distinction be made between knowledge that is ideologically determined and that which is not finds an echo in Mary Hesse’s finely-tuned concern to find a properly contexted but none the less normative role for the epistemologist. For a discussion of this and related issues to do with social interests see Mary Hesse, ‘The Strong Thesis of Sociology of Science’, in Mary Hesse, Revolutions and Reconstructions in the Philosophy of Science (Harvester, Brighton, 1980) pp. 29–60.
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© 1984 John Law and Peter Lodge
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Law, J., Lodge, P. (1984). The Social Structure of Ideology. In: Science for Social Scientists. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-17536-9_20
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-17536-9_20
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