Abstract
In Chapter 12 we argued that the extent to which actors are able to agree about the facts of the matter — that is, the extent to which they are able to align their networks — depends on the extent to which their interests are aligned. In the last two chapters we have presented examples where there was a complete failure to reach agreement. In each case we explained that failure by looking at the divergent interests of the audiences at which the knowledge was aimed. We found that these came to the debates with very different social prejudices, and sought to use the knowledge in question in very different ways. Hence the accusations of bias, cheating and improper practice; hence the attempts to undermine the legitimating natural accounts offered by the opposition and hence the attempts to sustain the account of nature being used to support the actor’s preferred social position.
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Endnotes
Our description of the gravity-wave controversy is drawn from H. M. Collins, ‘The seven sexes: a study in the sociology of a phenomenon, or the replication of experiments in physics’ Sociology, 9 (1975) pp. 205–24.
See also H. M. Collins, ‘Son of seven sexes: the social destruction of a physical phenomenon’, Social Studies of Science 11 (1981) p. 33–62.
Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, (George Allen & Unwin, London, 1930).
An analysis of and attack on Weber’s idealism is mounted in some detail in Barry Barnes, Interests and the Growth of Knowledge (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1977).
Following Hugh Trevor Roper, Barnes also attacks Weber’s thesis on empirical grounds. See H. R. Trevor Roper, Religion, and the Reformation and Social Change (Macmillan, London, 1967).
K. Marx and F. Engels, The German Ideology, Part 1 (Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1970).
For this criticism worked out in detail see Digby C. Anderson and W. W. Sharrock, ‘Biasing the News: technical issues in “Media Studies”’, Sociology, 13 (1979) pp. 367–85.
See Roland Barthes, Mythologies (Paladin, London, 1973).
See Gaston Bachelard, La Formation de l’Esprit Scientifique (Librairie Philosophique, J. Vrin, Paris, 1980).
See Barry Barnes, ‘Natural rationality: a neglected concept in the social sciences’, Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 6 (1976) pp. 115–26.
See Barry Barnes and David Bloor, ‘Relativism, rationalism and the sociology of knowledge’, pp. 21–47 in Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes (eds), Rationality and Relativism (Blackwell, Oxford, 1982).
See David Bloor’s study of the rationality of the Azande poison oracle for a more extended development of this analysis of logic. David C. Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1976).
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© 1984 John Law and Peter Lodge
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Law, J., Lodge, P. (1984). Negotiation, Persuasion and the Power of Knowledge. In: Science for Social Scientists. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-17536-9_14
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-17536-9_14
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