Abstract
The prime minister and his Cabinet ministers are the political actors discussed in this chapter. They are all, in terms of the South African Constitution, members of the legislature; the Cabinet is accountable to Parliament. As is typical in a Westminster system such as South Africa’s, the legislature’s role in foreign policy making is strictly limited, certainly far more so than in America’s presidential system. The formulation of foreign policy is first and foremost the function and indeed the prerogative of the executive. Certain members of the Executive Council, as the Cabinet is styled in the South African Constitution, understandably play a more influential role than others in the formulation of foreign policy.
“What war?” said the Prime Minister sharply. “No one has said anything to me about a war. I really think I should have been told. I’ll be damned,” he said defiantly, “if they shall have a war without consulting me. What’s a cabinet for, if there’s not more mutual confidence than that? What do they want a war for, anyway?”
Evelyn Waugh, Vile Bodies
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Notes to the Text
D’Oliveira, J, op. cit., pp.102–14.
See Olivier, GC, op. cit., p.184.
See D’Oliveira, J op. cit., pp.200ff;
Serfontein, JHP, Die Verkrampte Aanslag, op. cit., 197pp;
Schoeman, BM, Vorster se 100 Dae, Human & Rousseau, Cape Town, 1974, pp.18–32 and 268–80; and
Ries, A & E Dommisse, op. cit., pp.75ff. In a personal interview with the present author Vorster singled out the inclusion of Maoris in an All Black rugby team due to visit South Africa and the establishment of diplomatic ties with Malawi as the two main issues featuring in the breakaway of four rightwing Nationalist MPs in 1969. He also referred to the “absurdity” of these disaffected elements saying that the South African government should talk to black African leaders “but you should do it under a tree”.
D’Oliveira, J, op. cit., pp.197ff., and
Cockram, G-M, op. cit., pp.116ff.
See Geldenhuys, DJ and TD Venter, op. cit., pp.45–50.
An expression used by Munger, ES, Foreign Policy, op. cit., p.86.
See Vital, D, The Making of British Foreign Policy, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1968, p.54.
Barber, J, Who Makes British Foreign Policy?, Open University Press, Milton Keynes, 1976, p.13.
Botha, MC, op. cit., pp.153–5.
Hallett, R, “The South African intervention in Angola 1975–76”, African Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 303, July 1978, pp.356 & 357.
South Africa, Defence Headquarters, Nature and Extent of the SADF’s Involvement in the Angolan Conflict, Press Release, Roneoed, Pretoria, 3 February 1977, p.1.
Hallett, R, op. cit., p.357.
Hallett, R, op. cit., p.363.
Hallett, R, op. cit., p.361.
Hallett, R, op. cit., pp.370 & 371, and
De Villiers, LES, op. cit., p.146.
Hallett, R, op. cit., p.371.
Hallett, R, op. cit., p.382.
Ibid., p.384.
Through the Alvor Agreement, signed in the Algarve on 15 January 1975, Portugal hoped that a government of national unity would be formed in Angola. Such hopes had however been in vain. Another attempt was made through the Nakuru Agreement of 15 June, but this too proved abortive in the face of the power struggle between the MPLA, FNLA and UNITA (Legum, C & T Hodges, After Angola: The War over Southern Africa, Rex Collings, London, 1976, p.13).
Quoted by Van Rensburg, APJ, The Tangled Web: Leadership and Change in Southern Africa, HAUM, Cape Town, 1977, p.29.
Quoted by Hallett, R, op. cit., p.382.
See Hallett, R, op. cit., pp.380–83.
See HA Deb., 27/1/1976, col. 110–32. Vorster, ibid., 30/1/1976, col. 365–9, listed some key objectives: “to chase the MPLA and the Cubans away from the borders for which we are responsible”; to prevent the MPLA, with Russian and Cuban help, subjugating the entire Angolan population; to prevent Angola becoming “a base for attacks on South West Africa”, and “to bring to the notice of the free world and of Africa the fact that an unwilling people was being driven into the communist fold at the point of a bayonet.” (The last consideration already seems to cast doubt on the second one.)
Dr RA Schrire, quoted by Hallett, R, op. cit., p.366.
Steenkamp, W, Borderstrike! South Africa into Angola, Butterworth, Durban, 1983, pp.5–11.
Ibid., from the Foreword.
Winter, G, Inside BOSS: South Africa’s Secret Police, Penguin, Middlesex, 1981, pp.545–53.
See Nolutshungu, SC, op. cit., pp.264–6.
De Villiers, LES, op. cit.., 182pp., and
Rees, M and C Day, op. cit., 222pp. A forthcoming book is Rhoodie’s The Real Information Scandal, Orbis Publishers, Pretoria and Atlanta, 1983.
De Villiers, LES, op. cit., pp.13–17 & 38, and
Rees, M and C Day, op. cit., p.22.
De Villiers, LES, op. cit., pp.44–6 and Mulder interview. See also Erasmus Report 3, op. cit., par. 14.13.
Rees, M and C Day, op. cit., p.167.
De Villiers, LES, op. cit., pp.46 & 47. On the two Rhoodie brothers finding themselves in the top jobs, see Erasmus Report 3, op. cit., par. 14.13 and 14.14.
Quoted by De Villiers, LES, op. cit., p.62, and Rhoodie interview. See also Erasmus Report 3, op. cit., par. 3.21.
Consider the following statement attributed to Rhoodie by Les de Villiers, who was also present: “Mr Prime Minister, when I say that this should be a campaign where no rules apply, I mean every word of it. If it is necessary, for instance, for me to give an important person’s wife a fur coat, I should be able to do so. And if it is necessary to send a man on holiday to Hawaii with his mistress, I should be allowed to.” (Quoted by De Villiers, LES, op. cit., p.74.)
See Republic of South Africa, Tussentydse Verslag van die Kommissie van Ondersoek na Beweerde Onreëlmatighede in die Voormalige Departement van Inligting, Government Printer, Pretoria, 1979, par. 10–23. This was the second of the three Erasmus Commission reports and will hereafter be referred to as Erasmus Report 2, op. cit.
Mulder interview. See also Rees, M and C Day, op. cit., pp.22,23 & 175.
De Villiers, LES, op. cit., pp.153–6.
See Rees, M and C Day, op. cit., p.27.
De Villiers, LES, op. cit., p.148, and Erasmus Report 1, op. cit., par. 2.13. Although a minimum of R15 million a year was initially promised, it was on two occasions below that; on another it was under the R20 million Information had asked, and on a fourth occasion the requested amount of R23,9 million was reduced to R15 million. This, Finance Minister Horwood explained, he had deliberately done. Not only did he refuse to commit himself (which Diederichs, on the contrary, had done) to providing R15 million per annum, he also insisted that the Treasury be given details of the expenditure by Information. These were not forthcoming, he said (HA Deb., 7/12/1978, col. 109).
Rhoodie interview. See also De Villiers, LES, op. cit., p.148, and
Rees, M and C Day, op. cit., 222pp.
Ibid., par. 3.29 and HA Deb., 7/12/1978, col. 15 & 16. See also De Villiers, LES, op. cit., p.149.
See note 73 above.
See Rees, M and C Day, op. cit., pp.169–78.
Quoted by Rees, M and C Day, op. cit., p.133.
See Rees, M and C Day, op. cit., pp.121 & 214.
See Geldenhuys, DJ and TD Venter, op. cit., pp.49ff.
See Frankel, P, “Race and counter-revolution: South Africa’s ‘total strategy’ ”, Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vol. 28, No. 3, October 1980, pp.272–92, and
Geldenhuys, DJ, Total National Strategy, op. cit., 63pp.
See Giliomee, H, The Parting of the Ways: South African Politics 1976–82, David Philip Publishers, Cape Town, 1983, pp.14ff.
Schoeman, BJ, op. cit., pp.312 & 313, recalls a revealing incident in early 1966, when Verwoerd discussed a forthcoming Cabinet reshuffle with Schoeman. Verwoerd wanted to give Schoeman the Defence portfolio in addition to Transport, which he had already held for some years. Schoeman, however, suggested that PW Botha, then one of the deputy ministers, be made Minister of Defence. Verwoerd’s immediate reaction was: “But does he not also have the party organiser’s mentality like [FC] Erasmus? Erasmus always remained the party organiser and you know in what problems we landed from time to time, particularly because of his ill-considered handling of personnel.” Schoeman assured Verwoerd that PW Botha was of a different calibre and would prove a success. Verwoerd subsequently appointed PW Botha as Minister of Defence.
Quoted by Geldenhuys, DJ, Total National Strategy, op. cit., p.37.
Ibid., p.10.
Du Plessis, JE, “Die Veranderende Rol van die Kantoor van die Eerste Minister”, Paper presented at a meeting at the University of Port Elizabeth, 8/5/1980, Roneoed, by courtesy of Dr du Plessis, pp.3 & 4. A condensed version was subsequently published under the title, “Kantoor van die Premier: so verander sy rol”, UPE FOKUS, June 1980, pp.6 & 29. (Du Plessis was Director-General of the Office of the Prime Minister.) See also PW Botha, HA Deb., 6/2/1980, col. 233 & 234, and
Botes, PS, “Die sentrale administrasie”, in Nieuwoudt, CF, GC Olivier and M Hough (Eds), Die Politieke Stelsel van Suid-Afrika, Academica, Pretoria, 1981, pp.170 & 171.
Du Plessis, JE, op. cit., pp.5 & 6, and HA Deb., 6/2/1980, col. 234.
Du Plessis, JE, op. cit., pp.8 & 9.
Ibid., pp.13 & 14.
Ibid., pp.6 & 7 (source for the fifth and final points listed).
See Du Plessis, JE, op. cit., pp.4ff. and HA Deb., 6/2/1980, col. 234.
Frankel, J, op. cit., p.40 and
Vital, D, op. cit., pp.59–61.
Du Plessis, JE, op. cit., pp.7 & 11.
See ibid., p.9.
See Schoeman, BJ, op. cit., pp.343 & 421, for a first-hand account from a former Cabinet colleague of PW Botha’s.
PW Botha was dubbed “Pangaman”, according to Rhoodie, because “you’d never know when he was going to lash out at you” (quoted by Rees, M and C Day, op. cit., p.174).
In similar vein, Les de Villiers explained that PW Botha earned this nickname, for he was “not a man to be trifled with” (De Villiers, LES, op. cit., pp.96 & 168). As Defence Minister PW Botha was popularly known as “Piet Skiet” or “Piet Wapen”. (Pieter is his first name; “skiet” means shoot and “wapen” weapon.)
See Du Plessis, SPJ, Handelsverdrae as Instrument van die Suid-Afrikaanse Regering se Ekonomiese Beleid, MA dissertation, University of Pretoria, 1967, 222pp.
Neethling, DC, The Geopolitics of Mineral Supply: Access to and Availability of the Mineral Resources of Southern Africa, Paper read at the Conference on Southern African Metals in a World Context, Johannesburg, 11 and 12 May 1981, Roneoed, by courtesy of the author, pp.7 & 8 (Dr Neethling is Chief Director: Energy, in the Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs), and
Etheredge, DA, Presidential Address, 90th Annual General Meeting, Chamber of Mines of South Africa, Johannesburg, 24 June 1980, published by the Chamber of Mines, pp.3 & 10.
Neethling, DC, op. cit., p.8.
Ibid., p.9. See also Toespraak deur Sy Edele FW de Klerk, Minister van Mineraal- en Energiesake, by die Amptelike Opening van die Matla-steenkoolmyn, op Vrydag, 15 Mei 1981 om 12h30, Roneoed, by courtesy of the Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs, 21pp.
See Vale, PCJ, The Atlantic Nations and South Africa: Economic Constraints and Community Fracture, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Leicester, 1981, 446pp.
See Notas vir Toespraak deur Sy Edele FW de Klerk, Minister van Mineraal- en Energiesake, by Geleentheid van die Twintigste Algemene Jaarvergadering van die Suid-Afrikaanse Instituut vir Organisasie en Metode, op Donderdag, 26 Junie 1980 om 09h00, Roneoed, by courtesy of the Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs, p.13; Neethling, DC, op. cit., pp.9 & 10, and personal interview with Mr FW de Klerk.
See Speech by the South African Minister of Mines and of Environmental Planning and Energy, Mr FW de Klerk, at a Mini Seminar on Wednesday, 28 November 1979, the Gold Room, Pierre Hotel, New York, Roneoed, by courtesy of the Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs, pp.11–19, and Neethling, DC, op. cit., pp.4 & 5.
See Geldenhuys, DJ, “Some strategic implications of regional economic relationships for the Republic of South Africa”, ISSUP Strategic Review, University of Pretoria, January 1981, pp.17ff.
See Geldenhuys, DJ, “South Africa and the West”, in Schrire, R (Ed), South Africa: Public Policy Perspectives, Juta, Cape Town, 1982, pp.309–12.
De Villiers, LES, op. cit., pp.103 & 104.
Quoted by Geldenhuys, DJ, Total National Strategy, op. cit., pp.18–20.
Quoted by Shaw, JA, “The evolving framework for functional co-operation in Southern Africa”, paper delivered at a seminar on economic cooperation held at Thohoyandou, Venda, on 2 July 1981, Roneoed, by courtesy of the author, p.13.
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© 1984 D. J. Geldenhuys and the South African Institute of International Affairs
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Geldenhuys, D. (1984). The Executive: The Political Actors. In: The Diplomacy of Isolation. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-17501-7_4
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