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Abstract

In 1921, the British Government held an enquiry into the future of naval warfare in general and of battleships in particular. Among the witnesses called to give evidence before it there were several like Admiral S. S. Hall who believed that the day of the battleship was over; for evidence, he pointed to these vessels’ relative inactivity and apparent uselessness in the First World War.

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References

  1. Richmond, Evidence to the Cabinet Sub-Committee on Ship-building 5 January 1921, Cab 16/37 Public Record Office, London.

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  2. Battle description from ‘An Authentic Narrative‘ quoted in Woodward (1965) p. 52; also Gorshkov (1979) p. 75.

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  7. Quoted in Richmond (1946) pp. 30–1.

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  8. These passages owe much to Wilson (1957).

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  12. Such is the argument of Laughton (1875) p. 524.

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  29. In my view there is such a misjudgement in the excellent Schurman (1965) p. 142.

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  36. Ibid. p. 289.

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© 1984 Geoffrey Till

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Till, G. (1984). The Decisive Battle. In: Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-17464-5_4

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