The Heirs to the Subject that used to be called Philosophy

Abstract

I have now carried through my plan to present a systematic account of the sociological and naturalistic themes in Wittgenstein’s work. I have also indicated how his ideas can be developed by an empirical approach to the questions that he addressed — despite his own reluctance to do this. What I have tried to convey is a sense of the numerous points of contact between Wittgenstein’s concerns and issues that are not only amenable to empirical study, but positively cry out for such an approach.¹ If we forge our picture of the world in the context of social interaction — and no one has demonstrated this in more detail than Wittgenstein — then we should be able to see why different groups produce different pictures. This is why I insisted on reconstructing the idea of language-games within a comparative framework. This was why Wittgenstein’s cryptic references to ‘needs’ had to be filled out by giving them a social location and treating them as interests. With a theoretical framework to sharpen our vision we can see how his obscure talk of ‘spontaneity’ can be replaced by the thesis that the formation of language-games can be made law-like and intelligible. If I am right there are four main families of language-game that merit special attention. If this result is upheld it should help focus and simplify subsequent research.