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France and the Triple Entente in 1912

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France and the Origins of the First World War

Part of the book series: The Making of the 20th Century

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Abstract

Despite the signing of the Anglo-Russian agreement on Persia in 1907, which added the final corner to what became known as the Triple Entente, Europe was not yet unequivocally divided into the two opposing blocs which would confront each other in 1914. Triple Alliance and Triple Entente were as yet relatively flexible. For instance, shortly after concluding the agreement with Britain, Russia balanced it first by an agreement with Japan which weakened the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, then by an agreement with Germany to protect the status quo in the Baltic, and finally by proposals to the Austrians to extend the Balkan entente of 1897. Flirtations, agreements and ententes across the alliances were commonplace. No one as yet knew how far Britain, and indeed France, would go in supporting Russia in the event of a war after the Bosnian crisis of 1908–9. It was not even clear whether Britain would be willing to give military assistance to France. Finally, France’s attitude to the Triple Entente since Delcassé’s departure was lax and characteristic of the general diplomatic ‘laisser-aller’ of successive Radical ministries. The Radicals returned to power stronger than ever in the general elections of 1906, but their apparent strength was offset by signs of weakness which encouraged some foreign observers to question the solidity of the régime and to doubt the value of France as an ally.1 Certainly it was nothing new for domestic problems to dominate French Cabinet policy, but the period between 1906 and 1911 was characterised by a series of new and extremely divisive problems which led to a particular introspection.

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Notes and References

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  1. Manchester, UK

    John F. V. Keiger

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© 1983 John F. V. Keiger

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Keiger, J.F.V. (1983). France and the Triple Entente in 1912. In: France and the Origins of the First World War. The Making of the 20th Century. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-17209-2_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-17209-2_6

  • Publisher Name: Palgrave, London

  • Print ISBN: 978-0-333-28552-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-349-17209-2

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