New Weapons Technology and the Concept of Nuclear Threshold: An Appraisal of the Relationship

  • A. Karkoszka

Abstract

With the introduction of nuclear weapons into international politics, the relations between states and the associated military doctrines changed dramatically.1 The profoundness of the change has clearly indicated the awesome potentialities of military technology and has since then made us aware of the consequences of military technological innovations. The vigilance has been justified: although there have been no further revolutionary advances such as that embodied in NWs, several other powerful weapon systems have, however, been introduced with serious consequences for the security and stability of the international system. However, the introduction of these weapon systems, whether ICBMs, SLBMs, MIRVs or cruise missiles, although they appear to indicate a dangerous, potentially perilous trend toward a counterforce first-strike capability, has so far not had a disastrous, destabilising effect on the strategic deterrence relationship between East and West.

Keywords

Europe Explosive Assure Nash Stake 

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Notes

  1. 1.
    H. T. Nash, Nuclear Weapons and International Behaviour ( London: A. W. Sijthoff, 1975 ).Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    H. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy ( New York: W. W. Newton, 1969 ) p. 158.Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    R. H. Kupperman, R. M. Behr, T. P. Jones, Jr., ‘The Deterrence Continuum’, Orbis, Fall 1974, xvii: 3, p. 738.Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    S. J. Deitchman, New Technology and Military Power: General Purpose Military Forces for the 1980s and Beyond. ( Bolder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979 ) p. 278.Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    R. Burt, ‘New Weapons Technologies, Debate and Direction’, Adelphi Papers, no. 126 (IISS, 1976 ) p. 22.Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    G. R. Lindsay: The Linkages of New Technology to Strategic and Theatre Deterrence and Warfighting. Paper presented at the 1980 Millennium Conference, London School of Economics, April 1980, pp. 4 and 8.Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    L. Martin, ‘Flexibility in Tactical Nuclear Response’ in J. J. Holst and U. Nerlich (eds), Beyond Nuclear Deterrence. New Aims, New Arms ( New York: Crane, Russak, 1977 ) p. 263.Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    R. D. Speed, Strategic Deterrence in the 1980s. ( Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 1979 ) pp. 117–19.Google Scholar
  9. 10.
    M. L. Nacht, ‘Technology and Strategy’, National Defense, November-December 1976, Lxi: 339, p. 201.Google Scholar
  10. 11.
    O. Heilbrunn, Conventional Warfare in the Nuclear Age ( New York: F. A. Praeger, 1965 ) p. 129.Google Scholar
  11. 12.
    W. F. Biddle, Weapons Technology and Arms Control ( New York: F. A. Praeger, 1972 ) p. 257.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© William F. Gutteridge and Trevor Taylor 1983

Authors and Affiliations

  • A. Karkoszka
    • 1
  1. 1.Poland

Personalised recommendations