The Threat from Japan Takes Priority

  • Jonathan Haslam
Part of the Studies in Soviet History and Society book series (SSHS)


Although Soviet appeasement of Japan stands in stark contrast to Moscow’s foreign policy position prior to the Manchurian crisis, there was no lack of effort in the USSR’s desperate search for a position of strength by both the mobilisation of military and economic resources at home and the mustering of other Communist Parties abroad to weaken Japan’s capacity to wage war.


Foreign Policy Chinese Communist Party Railway Wagon Capitalist Country Local Party 
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Notes and References

  1. 1.
    S. Zakharov et al, Tikhookeanskii Flot (Moscow, 1966) pp. 118–21.Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Japanese estimates were as follows: September 1931 sharpshooter divisions 6 cavalry brigades 2 September 1932 sharpshooter divisions 8 cavalry divisions 1 brigades 11 aircraft 200 tanks 205 IMTFE: Japanese Trials 27 May–4 June 1947, pp. 23 555–6. Other estimates are less detailed. Lt Col. De Ferrari, the Italian military attaché, put the total figure at not less than 100 000 — Attolico (Moscow) to Rome, 15.3.32: ASD, URSS, (1932) b.5, pac. 1.1. The Polish military attaché, on the other hand, estimated 200 000. The massive difference in the size of the estimate may be accounted for partly by the inclusion of paramilitary forces in the Polish figure, and also by an understandable tendency on the part of the Poles to err on the side of exaggeration where Red Army numbers were concerned. The British, lacking an attaché in Moscow, relied on these Polish figures — Ovey (Moscow) to Simon (London), 28.3.32: DBFP, op. cit., vol. X, edited by Medlicott et al. (London, 1969) doc. 149.Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Istoriya Vtoroi Mirovoi Voiny 1939–1945, edited by A. Grechko et al. (Moscow, 1973) vol. 1, p. 110.Google Scholar
  4. 6.
    UK delegation (Geneva) to London, 26.4.32: ibid., doc. 270 (enclosure); also, for further evidence, see Attolico (Moscow) to Rome, 15.3.32, as cited in 2. The Soviet budget deliberately concealed the real increase in defence spending: J. Cooper, “Defence Production and the Soviet Economy 1929–1941”, CREES Discussion Papers, Series SIPS, no. 3 (Birmingham, 1976) pp. 33–41.Google Scholar
  5. 14.
    K.K. Shirinya, Strategiya i Taktika Kominterna v Bor’be Protiv Fashizma i Voiny (1934–1939gg) (Moscow, 1979) p. 49.Google Scholar
  6. 15.
    Quoted from the Bulgarian Party archives by F.I. Firsov, “Georgi Dimitrov and the West European Bureau of the Comintern”, in Georgi Dimitrov: an Outstanding Militant of the Comintern (English edition, Sofia, 1972).Google Scholar
  7. 16.
    Iz Istorii Mezhdunarodnoi Proletarskoi Solidarnosti: Dokumenty i Materialy, Sbornik IV: Mezhdunarodnaya Proletarskaya Solidarnost’ v Bor’be s Nastupleniem Fashizma (1928–1932), edited by G.A. Belov et al. (Moscow, 1960) doc. 174.Google Scholar
  8. 27.
    Babette Gross, WILLI MÜNZENBERG: Eine politische Biographie (Stuttgart, 1967) pp. 236–7.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. 34.
    B. Sh., “Itogi razoruzhitel’noi komissii v svete protivorechii imperializma”, Mirovoe Khozyaistvo i Mirovaya Politika, no. 1 (1931) pp. 17–20.Google Scholar
  10. 38.
    Speech by Grandi: Documents on International Affairs 1931, edited by J.W. Wheeler-Bennett (London, 1932) p. 39.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Jonathan Haslam 1983

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jonathan Haslam
    • 1
  1. 1.University of BirminghamUK

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