The Place of Germany in Soviet Policy: 1930–31

Abstract

From the onset of the Depression until 1933, German politics increasingly became polarised between two extremes: Communism and Fascism. Both tendencies were a product of the slump and the iniquities of the Versailles peace settlement. Existing German Governments, whether headed by Social Democrat or Centre Party politicians, sought a solution in closer integration with the victor Powers, aided by British and US mediation. The consequences for Moscow were viewed with great alarm by the Soviet leadership, supremely anxious to maintain the divide between those who had won and those who had lost in World War I as a proven guarantee against the formation of an anti-Soviet coalition. Soviet hopes therefore naturally turned on the polarisation of German domestic politics. But the prospects for a Communist-led coup in Berlin were too uncertain to be gambled upon, and although others, particularly at Comintern headquarters, may not have shared his outlook, Litvinov ably voiced sentiments which were undoubtedly shared by Stalin when he told the British ambassador that: “The Soviets wanted no revolution in Germany or elsewhere today; world revolution was undoubtedly ‘on their books’ but for the moment they were entirely concentrated on the five-year plan and wished to show concrete results in their own country as the best form of propaganda”.