Abstract
Mao’s legacy in the strategic domain of what might be called geopolitical thought or power politics is less ambiguous even though it has never been formally articulated. By geopolitical thought I refer to the broader use of the term. As used here the term refers not only to the significance of geographical factors in international politics, but it also relates to the larger view as to the nature of power and its place in international affairs. In other words, I shall argue that Mao had a coherent and distinctive view of the character of international politics in which considerations of balance of power played a large part. It will be argued that it was this vision which effectively guided the Chinese ship of state in its position of relative weakness in the face of challenges to its independence by countries militarily stronger than itself.
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Notes and References
This point is made forcibly by John Gittings, ‘The Statesman’, in Dick Wilson (ed.), Mao Tse-tung in the Scales of History (Cambridge University Press, 1977) pp. 266–7. For an example of Mao’s ignorance of African conditions see his ‘Conversation with Zanzibar Expert M. M. Ali and his Wife’ of 18 June 1964 in JPRS, 61269–2, (20 February 1974) pp. 361–71.
For an analysis of this see Frederic Wakeman, History and Will: Philosophical Perspectives of Mao Tse tung’s Thought (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1973) pp. 229–37 and 295–301.
For a social—scientific analysis of Mao’s attempt to transform China’s political culture along revolutionary lines, see Richard H. Solomon, Mao’s Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1971). Frederic Wakeman, History and Will presents a more philosophical analysis.
For the best analysis of Mao’s theories and practice of (international) united fronts, see J. D. Armstrong, Revolutionary Diplomacy (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1977).
See, for example, Frank E. Armbruster, ‘China’s Conventional Military Capability’, in Tang Tsou (ed.), China in Crisis (University of Chicago Press, 1968) vol. II.
See John F. Copper, China’s Foreign Aid (Lexington, Mass., D. C. Heath, 1976), chapter 6.
See the discussion in Wang Gung-wu, China and the World Since 1949: The Impact of Independence, Modernity and Revolution (London, Macmillan, 1977), pp. 9–12.
For an argument to the contrary see Joseph Camilleri, Chinese Foreign Policy: The Maoist Era and its Aftermath (Oxford, Martin Robertson 1980) Part One and especially Chapter One.
Edgar Snow, The Long Revolution (New York, Random House, 1972) pp. 19–20.
See Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1975), chapters 1–5.
See also Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang, China Under Threat: The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), chapter 4.
See also the analyses by Richard Wich, Sino-Soviet Crisis Politics pp. 80–1 and by K. S. Karol, The Second Chinese Revolution (London, Jonathan Cape, 1975) pp. 390–5.
The subsequent account is based on the analysis by Gurtov and Hwang, op. cit. Chapter 6; Richard Wich, op. cit. chapters 6–9; Neville Maxwell, ‘The Chinese Account of the 1969 Fighting at Chen Pao’, The China Quarterly no. 56 (October-December 1973) pp. 730–9.
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© 1983 Michael Yahuda
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Yahuda, M. (1983). Mao’s Legacy of Geopolitical Thought. In: Towards the End of Isolationism: China’s Foreign Policy after Mao. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-17149-1_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-17149-1_3
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