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Abstract

Few aspects of Mao’s legacy are as ambiguous and as susceptible to varying interpretations as that concerned with the relationship to be established between the Chinese people with their socialist society and the outside world. Mao himself had coined the slogan ‘Make foreign things serve China’. In other words he had called upon his people to learn from the good and socially serviceable things developed in the outside world while eschewing the harmful and the undesirable. How to distinguish between them was never made clear. Nor did Mao address the issue of how advanced foreign experience or technology could be absorbed without dragging in tow undesirable consequences. For example, he seems to have had little to say on the question as to whether technology was socially neutral. That is to say, whether technology, for instance, in the shape of a whole industrial plant with a complete set of equipment necessarily carried with it the imprint of the society in which it had been originally made. He presided over the period of the First Five Year Plan (1952–57) in which China’s doors were open wider than ever before or since to the influences of a foreign country — the Soviet Union.

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Notes and References

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© 1983 Michael Yahuda

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Yahuda, M. (1983). Chinese Society and Foreign Relations. In: Towards the End of Isolationism: China’s Foreign Policy after Mao. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-17149-1_2

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