Abstract
Up to this point in the analysis of scientific activity I have been working within the system of concepts that most scientists subscribe to in their own reflections on their ways of thinking and working. It is now time to step outside this system since it does not have the objectivity and universality that is sometimes assumed by those who use it. In the discussion of theories and the relation of evidence to hypotheses I have presumed that the logical distinctions between facts and theories and between hypotheses and data are aspects of one deep lying division. On the one hand there are the speculative constructions of the scientific mind, laws and theories; while on the other are the indubitable facts which form the bedrock of scientific knowledge, and which we can properly call ‘data’, that which is given.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
W. Whewell, The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, Original edition, London, 1847; Johnson Reprint Corporation, New York, 1967; Book I.
N. R. Hanson, The Concept of the Positron, Cambridge University Press, 1963.
J. J. Gibson, The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1968.
P. K. Feyerabend, Against Method, New Left Books, London, 1975.
D. Papineau, ‘The Vis Viva controversy: Do meanings matter?’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 8, 1977, 111–142.
H. Putnam, Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2, Cambridge University Press, 1975.
S. E. Toulmin, Human Understanding, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1972.
R. Harré, Great Scientific Experiments, Phaidon Press, Oxford, 1982.
T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, University of Chicago Press, 1962.
D. Shapere, ‘Meaning and scientific change’, in R. G. Colodny (ed.), Mind and Cosmos, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1966, pp. 41–85.
K. Knorr-Cetina, The Manufacture of Knowledge, Pergamon Press, Oxford, 1982.
J. Ravetz, Scientific Knowledge and Its Social Problems, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1977.
D. Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1976.
B. Barnes, T. S. Kuhn and Social Science, Macmillan, London, 1982.
B. Barnes, Interests and the Growth of Knowledge, Routledge & Kegan Paul, Oxford, 1977.
B. Latour and A. Woolgar, Laboratory Life, Sage, Los Angeles, 1979.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 1983 Horace Romano Harré
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Harré, R. (1983). Postscript to Second Edition. In: An Introduction to the Logic of the Sciences. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-17102-6_8
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-17102-6_8
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-17104-0
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-17102-6
eBook Packages: Palgrave Religion & Philosophy CollectionPhilosophy and Religion (R0)