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Supporting Paper: The Political Rationale of Soviet Military Capabilities and Doctrine

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Abstract

The momentum of the Soviet military buildup of the 1960s and 1970s shows every sign of being carried over into the 1980s. Serial production of modern tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery pieces, fighter aircraft, medium-range bombers and missiles, as well as cruisers and aircraft carriers, is continuing. New weapons are being developed and tested. New large military production plants and assembly buildings are being constructed. The technological gap in weapon systems has been closed in many areas, and in some areas the Soviet Union has taken the lead.

Keywords

Foreign Policy Nuclear Weapon Military Power Ballistic Missile Italic Mine 
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Notes

  1. 20.
    Nathan Leites, The Operational Code of the Politburo ( New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951 );Google Scholar
  2. 20.
    Richard Pipes, “Some Operational Principles of Soviet Foreign Policy,” in The USSR and the Middle East, Michael Confino and Shimon Shamir, eds. (Jerusalem: Israel University Press, 1973), pp. 5–30Google Scholar
  3. 20.
    Pipes, “Operational Principles of Soviet Foreign Policy,” Survey, Spring 1973, pp. 41–61;Google Scholar
  4. 20.
    Alexander L. George, “The ‘Operational Code’: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making,” in The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy, Erik P. Hoffmann and Frederic J. Fleron, Jr., eds. (London: Butterworths, 1971), pp. 165–90 (reprinted from International Studies Quarterly, June 1969, pp. 190–220 ).Google Scholar
  5. 23.
    G. Shakhnazarov, “K probleme sootnosheniia sil vi mire,” Kommunist, February 1974, pp. 77–89. Shakhnazarov is deputy head of the Central Committee department responsible for relations with the communist and workers’ parties.Google Scholar
  6. 32.
    Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin ( New York: Harcourt Brace and World, 1962 ), p. 114.Google Scholar
  7. 34.
    For details of these probes see Ken Booth, The Military Instrument in Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917–1972 ( London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 1973 ), pp. 38–40.Google Scholar
  8. 40.
    Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age ( New York: Praeger, 1958 ), p. 62.Google Scholar
  9. 49.
    Marshal Rotmistrov, Commander of the Tank Forces Academy, Kasnaia zvezda, 25 April 1964.Google Scholar
  10. 69.
    Phillip A. Karber, “How to Lose an Arms Race: The Competition in Conventional Forces Deployed in Central Europe, 1965–1980,” paper published (in German) as Chapter I in Sowjetische Macht and westliche Verhandlungsstrategie im Wandel militärischer Kräfteverhältnisse, Uwe Nerlich, ed., Series Internationale Politik and Sicherheit, Stiftung Wissenschaft and Politik ( Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1982 ).Google Scholar
  11. 76.
    Jurgen Rohwer, “Admiral Gorshkov and the Influence of History Upon Sea Power,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (May 1981), p. 172.Google Scholar
  12. 84.
    V. M. Kulish, “Detente, International Relations and Military Might,” Coexistence (Glasgow), XIV, 2 (1977), p. 190 (italics mine).Google Scholar
  13. 86.
    This is a point noted by David Holloway, “Military Power and Political Purpose in Soviet Policy,” Daedalus, Fall 1980, pp. 23–24.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© The American Academy of Arts and Sciences 1983

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.EbenhausenFederal Republic of Germany

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