Abstract
After the end of the Second World War, and the use of the atomic bomb on Japanese cities, America came to adopt a defensive justification for the retention of nuclear weapons. This change was never entirely credible to her international opponents. But to judge from the strategic literature, especially after 1949 when the Soviet Union demonstrated its nuclear capacity, strategic thinking in the United States became defensive, the focus being on ‘massive retaliation’ and deterrence. It is true that some argued even after 1949 that it was better to risk death than to risk communist take-over. This would imply that in the face of Soviet expansionism, America should first threaten and then, if necessary, use its nuclear weapons, even at the risk of Russian retaliation. This was at least one implication of the jingle “better dead than red” and of the demand for “roll-back” in Eastern Europe. But most people would not choose death for a large portion of mankind rather than accept survival at the price of subjecting themselves to a tyranny. It is one thing to risk one’s own life for the sake of freedom. It is another thing to risk the physical destruction of civilization.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsPreview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
Quoted in Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, op. cit., p. 275; from George Kennan, “A Conversation with George F. Kennan”, Encounter XLVII 3:37 (Sept. 1976).
Herman Kahn denied this thesis in On Thermonuclear War (Princeton, NJ., 1960).
His point of view is attacked in Paul Ramsey, War and the Christian Conscience (Durham, 1961), especially pp. 244–72.
Cf. Paul Ramsey, “A Political Ethics Context for Strategic Thinking” in Morton A. Kaplan (ed.), Strategic Thinking and Its Moral Implications (Chicago, 5973) PP. 134–5.
An excuse, not a justification, cf. J. L. Austin, “A Plea for Excuses”, in his Philosophical Papers (Oxford, 1970) pp. 175 ff.
One suggestion of T. C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960) pp. 261 ff.
The objector might appeal to one of Kant’s formulations of the categorical imperative and say that such a strategy uses the members of the armed forces as “means” rather than “ends” by failing to recognize their dignity as moral agents. See H. J. Paton, The Moral Law (London, 1948) p. 91.
Sissela Bok, Lying (New York, 1978), pp. 141 ff.
Cf. Philip Green, Deadly Logic (Ohio, 1966) p. 299; “By ‘escalation’ we mean the transgression on (sic) an implicitly or explicitly established limit by one side in a military conflict.”
Carey B. Joynt, “The Anatomy of Crises”, The Year Book of World Affairs, 1974 vol. 28 (London, 1974), 15–22.
We can call “landslide” stakes those which pose the danger of a hierarchical shift in the international system; marginal stakes are those which pose the possibility of gains and losses but which do not involve a hierarchical shift. For the concept of a hierarchical ranking, see G. Schwarzenberger, Power Politics (1951) chs. 6 and 7.
See Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society (New York, 1977) pp. 124–6.
F. H. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace (Cambridge, 1963) pp. 76–9 and p. 355.
Convenient sources for the nuclear proliferation issues are: John Maddox, Prospects for Nuclear Proliferation, Adelphi Papers 113 (London, 1975);
Ted Greenwood, George W. Rathjens and Jack Ruina, Nuclear Power and Weapons Proliferation, Adelphi Papers 130 (London, 1976);
Ted Greenwood, “The Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”, in The Diffusion of Power, Adelphi Papers 133 (London, 1977) 24–32;
Albert Wohlstetter, “Spreading the Bomb Without Quite Breaking the Rules”, Foreign Policy, 25 (Winter 1976/77) 88–96 and 198 Ethics and International Affairs 145–79;
Thomas Halsted, “Why No End to Nuclear Testing”, Survival (Mar./ Apr. 1977) 60–6;
L. A. Dunn, M. Brennen and J. S. Nye, Jr., “Proliferation Watch”, Foreign Policy 36 (Fall 1979) 71–104.
John R. Larmarch in the New York Times, 24 Nov. 1979.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 1982 J. E. Hare and Carey B. Joynt
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Hare, J.E., Joynt, C.B. (1982). Deterrence. In: Ethics and International Affairs. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-16741-8_5
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-16741-8_5
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-16743-2
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-16741-8
eBook Packages: Palgrave Political & Intern. Studies CollectionPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)