Deterrence

Abstract

After the end of the Second World War, and the use of the atomic bomb on Japanese cities, America came to adopt a defensive justification for the retention of nuclear weapons. This change was never entirely credible to her international opponents. But to judge from the strategic literature, especially after 1949 when the Soviet Union demonstrated its nuclear capacity, strategic thinking in the United States became defensive, the focus being on ‘massive retaliation’ and deterrence. It is true that some argued even after 1949 that it was better to risk death than to risk communist take-over. This would imply that in the face of Soviet expansionism, America should first threaten and then, if necessary, use its nuclear weapons, even at the risk of Russian retaliation. This was at least one implication of the jingle “better dead than red” and of the demand for “roll-back” in Eastern Europe. But most people would not choose death for a large portion of mankind rather than accept survival at the price of subjecting themselves to a tyranny. It is one thing to risk one’s own life for the sake of freedom. It is another thing to risk the physical destruction of civilization.