Introduction

Abstract

The central objective of this book is to generate empirical generalizations that may serve as theoretical propositions on decision making and group influence in Soviet politics. For several reasons, a complete and all-encompassing theory of decision making in the Soviet Union is not the aim. First, a theory of decision making, in my opinion, is not valid unless it is an empirical theory, i.e. a system of logically related, empirically testable, lawlike propositions.¹ Such a theory is a human construct based on empirically observed phenomena. A political theory not based on the observable world would be a normative theory and would fall in the category of political philosophy. I believe that our understanding of decision making in Soviet politics is not advanced by excercises in political philosophy. Second, I am well aware of the limitations of the scientific inquiry of Soviet political processes. What we can discover of the goings-on in Soviet political institutions will always remain limited, especially if compared with democratic systems. The construction of a theory would require the availability of many more empirical data than are potentially at our disposal. This is not to say that we are not making any progress; it is a pleasing fact that more and more studies of Soviet decision making are partially based on interviews with the persons involved.