The Last Days of Peace

Abstract

The Nazi-Soviet Pact improved the strategic position of Britain and France by destroying the Anti-Comintern grouping. It discredited the Japanese military ‘extremists’ who had been pressing for closer ties with Germany. The Hiranuma government which had been discussing Ribbentrop’s tripartite alliance resigned and was replaced by a cabinet determined to pursue a policy of noninvolvement in European affairs.¹ The Western powers were thus freed of the axis threat in the Far East. It was already clear that Mussolini was reluctant to support German designs on Poland² and the new pact did nothing to stimulate Italian enthusiasm for war. On the other hand it doomed Poland if Hitler chose to launch an attack. The main question faced in Washington was whether Chamberlain would defend Poland or whether he would respond to peace feelers from Berlin. If the Prime Minister stood firm Hitler might hesitate to risk war with only the unreliable Stalin as an ally. The main aim of Roosevelt’s policy during the Polish crisis, therefore, was to keep Italy at a distance from its erstwhile axis partner while doing nothing to encourage a second Munich at the expense of Poland.