Abstract
Scientific knowledge has come to epitomise what is meant by studying things objectively. The success of its predictions and the scope of its explanations have given us confidence that the symbolic form of science-its concepts, laws and theories-accurately reflects the facts and processes in the physical world. Philosophers of science under the influence of logical positivism attempted to make the objective elements of science explicit by looking for general logical principles for the selection and verification of scientific statements. The search produced the complex thesis that there is a neutral, objective, value-free language in which the facts of the world can be described and with which the statements of science can be evaluated. The terms of science are to refer ultimately to the facts we sense and experience and which are describable in this value-free language. Apart from logical terms, sciences are to include only such empirical terms. Moreover, there are logical criteria that can be used to decide what laws or theories best explain a set of facts and relationships.
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Notes and References
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© 1980 Robert David Sack
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Sack, R.D. (1980). Science and Subjectivity. In: Conceptions of Space in Social Thought. Critical Human Geography. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-16433-2_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-16433-2_2
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