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Market Structure and Market Organisation in the Electricity and Gas Public Utility Sector of the Federal Republic of Germany

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Public and Private Enterprise in a Mixed Economy

Part of the book series: International Economic Association Series ((IEA))

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Abstract

The electricity and gas public utility sector of the FRG consists of a decentralised system of supply with a considerable degree of concentration of decision-making power. The titles to real estate (including that of the public road system) as well as to the economic resources, both of which are regulated by the civil law, form the legal basis of their supply activities. The owners are the public territorial authorities (states and cities, and, in the electricity sector, also the federal state), private subjects (individual persons and firms), as well as the so-called mixed companies which belong both to private and public owners. The public utilities are essentially free in their investment policy though the Energiewirtschaftsgesetz allows far-reaching government intervention which, however, has not occurred to any great extent. Regulation of investments, beyond certain minor measures of control, does not take place. It is true that the construction of oil and gas plants has been restricted in recent years. But this was not part of an overall control scheme in the electricity sector but was only intended to stabilise hard coal consumption in this sector.

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Notes

  1. Chadwick, E., ‘Results of Different Principles of Legislation and Administration in Europe; of Competition for the Field, as Compared with the Competition within the Field of Service’, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society (1859).

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  2. Chadwick’s position has turned up again in several articles of Demsetz. Demsetz, H., ‘Why Regulate Utilities?’ The Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 11 (1968), 55–65; ‘Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint’, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 12 (1969), 1–22; ‘On the Regulation of Industry: A Reply’, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 79 (1971), 356–65.

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  3. Williamson, O.E., ‘Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopoly —, in General and with Respect to CATV’, The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 7 (1976), No. 1, 73–104.

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  4. Faulhaber, G. R., ‘Cross-Subsidization: Pricing in Public Enterprises’, American Economic Review, Vol. 65 (1975), 966–77, 968.

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  5. Gröner, H., ‘Ordnungspolitik in der Elektrizitätswirtschaft’, ORDO, Bd. 15/16 (1965), 333–412; Grundzügeeiner Wettbewerbsordnung für die Elektrizitätswirtschaft’, SchdVfS, NF Bd. 65 (1972), 47–69; ‘Die Ordnung der deutschen Elektrizitätswirtschaft’, Baden-Baden (1975).

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  6. Baumol, W. J., E. E. Bailey, R. D. Willing, ‘Weak Invisible Hand Theorems on the Sustainability of Prices in a Multiproduct Monopoly’, American Economic Review, Vol. 67 (1975), 350–65. The fact that the units in which charges are calibrated are the customers (or more exactly: the characteristics of the delivery), while the stability of supply areas is a matter of keeping regional markets together, poses additional problems. We refer to the discussion about the output unit in the public utility and transportation sector, which dates back to the Taussig-Pigou Controversy in the 1913 Quarterly Journal of Economics.

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  7. The parallel to the treatment of price discrimination in the Robinson-Patman Act, which also confines itself largely to price differences instead of the solely relevant differences in profits, is surely no accident. Cf. Adelman, M. A., ‘Price Discrimination as Treated in the Attorney General’s Report’, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 104 (1955/6), 222–42.

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© 1980 International Economic Association

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Schneider, H.K., Schulz, W. (1980). Market Structure and Market Organisation in the Electricity and Gas Public Utility Sector of the Federal Republic of Germany. In: Baumol, W.J. (eds) Public and Private Enterprise in a Mixed Economy. International Economic Association Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-16394-6_11

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