The Problem of Strategy

Abstract

A force of submarine-launched missiles was ideal for a small nuclear power. Against McNamara’s list of disadvantages of limited nuclear capabilities, Britain’s Polaris missiles came out remarkably well. They were neither particularly expensive nor ‘prone to obsolescence’. McNamara’s strictures concerning the danger and lack of credibility of independent nuclear forces assumed vulnerability to surprise attack. This could encourage crisis instability, in which both sides would have an incentive to launch a pre-emptive attack, lest its retaliatory forces get caught on the ground in a disarming strike. The Polaris force met this objection. It could not be easily destroyed in a surprise attack and nor was there an incentive for the enemy to attempt to do so, as Polaris was only good for crude retaliation, lacking the accuracy for strikes against the enemy’s own strategic forces. In the new jargon of strategic studies, Polaris was an exemplary ‘second-strike’ weapon.