Abstract
What sharpened the Foreign Office’s anxiety in 1942 about the sympathetic attitude of the Prime Minister and the American government towards Vichy was the increasing likelihood of action by the Allies to land an occupying force in North Africa before the end of the year, if necessary by force, but if possible with the acquiescence of the local authorities and the blessing of the Vichy government itself. The project was one which had long exerted a powerful attraction upon Churchill, and he employed all his considerable powers of persuasion in its support during his visit to Washington in December 1941. Six months were to elapse, however, before the final decision to proceed was reached. Although Roosevelt himself favoured the project, American military planners were almost unanimously hostile. Generals Marshall, Eisenhower and Clark were convinced that a direct assault upon the European mainland should be attempted, and the early months of 1942 were taken up with planning towards this end. Even as late as May, the American government was making qualified undertakings to Molotov that a second front would be established in Europe in 1942. When it became apparent that such a plan stood little chance of success, Marshall, supported by Admiral King, suggested a drastic change of strategy involving a decisive attack upon Japan in the Pacific.
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© 1979 R. T. Thomas
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Thomas, R.T. (1979). Operation ‘Torch’. In: Britain and Vichy. The Making of 20th Century. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-16052-5_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-16052-5_8
Publisher Name: Palgrave, London
Print ISBN: 978-0-333-24313-8
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