Vichy France, de Gaulle France, Weygand France

Abstract

In the months after the signature of the Armistice, the full complexity of the dilemma facing the British government gradually emerged. On the one hand, Vichy’s bad faith in reneging on its engagements combined with the bitterness caused by the attack at Mers-el-Kébir to make it impossible for relations to be established on a basis of mutual trust, while the democratic solidarity which had existed with the Third Republic was swept away when the regime voted itself out of existence on to July and established under Marshal Pétain a form of government which seemed to bring it into close ideological accord with the Axis powers. The Vichy regime appeared to many to be a form of National Socialism with which the British should have no dealings in principle. On the other hand, it soon became apparent that Vichy would continue to wield a significant degree of power as long as it retained its Fleet and Empire. Some form of contact could therefore be regarded as essential if these were to be denied to the enemy or even, perhaps, secured for the Allied cause.