Russia: Stage Two

Abstract

In the afternoon of 27 May 1939 — three days after Chamberlain’s encouraging announcement — Molotov summonded the Western diplomatic representatives at Moscow, and told them that his personal reaction to the new initiative of their Governments was negative.¹ On 2 June he followed this gloomy warning by a new draft — which, he suggested, was a modification of their own proposals, designed to meet the views of the Soviet Union. Two points in particular exercised the Russians. First, there should be ‘concrete agreement as to the form and extent of assistance’. This question would later prove of great importance, but did not play a large part in discussions for several weeks. Much more immediate attention was given to Molotov’s second point. The three Great Powers, he considered, should issue what were euphemistically called ‘guarantees’ to the Baltic States. This geographical term was coming to be used in a rather unusual way, to cover Estonia, Latvia and Finland. ‘Clearly,’ explained Halifax to the Foreign Policy Committee,

the Soviet Government feared, or pretended to fear, that the three Baltic States might not, when subjected to German aggression, turn to Russia for help, and indeed might acquiesce more or less willingly in Germany’s aggression. The result would be very serious so far as Russia was concerned.²

‘But I don’t like a policy which leaves us to face any mess into which bankrupt France may be dragged by barbarian Russia.’ Viscount Morley to the Earl of Rosebery, 7 August 1914. Rosebery papers, Box 37, National Library of Scotland

‘The treacherous cynicism of Stalin & Co, with our military mission sitting and negotiating in Moscow is beyond belief… I wish that I thought that it would shock the blind faith of the Opposition in the Soviet virtues…’ Sir Nevile Henderson to Viscount Halifax 22 August 1939. FO 800/316, fo. 217 seq.