Skip to main content

A Changed Concept of Dialectic

  • Chapter
The Melancholy Science
  • 28 Accesses

Abstract

For Marx, and many later Marxists, the critique of philosophy was equally the critique of society. This was not accomplished by relating the claims of philosophy to their social origin and thereby undermining their validity in a relativist fashion, but by demonstrating that the philosophy in question was wrong: self-contradictory, fundamentally inconsistent or antinomical and thus inherently self-defeating. A new notion of theory as the analysis of society was developed and the relation between philosophy as theory and philosophy as a form of practice defined. Adorno took this task upon himself, seeking to show that philosophy is impossible but essential — as theory — but that even as theory of society, it is bound to be self-defeating.1

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Notes

  1. Friedrich Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy 1888, (C. P. Dutt (ed.), New York: International Publishers, 1970 (1941)), p. 13, my emphasis.

    Google Scholar 

  2. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp-Smith (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1965),’p. 386.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Authors

Copyright information

© 1978 Gillian Rose

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Rose, G. (1978). A Changed Concept of Dialectic. In: The Melancholy Science. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-15985-7_4

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics