Chichester to Boston: the Concept of Natural Justice

Abstract

The letter from the Dean on behalf of the Chichester Society arrived in the middle of the Winchester inquiry and when that was over I visited the town and met the Committee. It was an unusual case. The proposal was to render permanent a six-month trial pedestrianisation of the centre streets of the town. The objectors, consisting of thousands of concerned people, contended that, though superficially attractive, the proposal had hidden implications relating to the damage from juggernauts to certain attractive and historic buildings along the rear access roads in certain areas of the town. It was the hidden implications and what lay behind it all that made me keen to take the case.

The principle ‘audi alteram partem’ goes back many centuries in our law and appears in a multitude of judgements of judges of the highest authority. In modern times, opinions have sometimes been expressed to the effect that natural justice is so vague as to be practically meaningless. But I would regard these as tainted by the perennial fallacy that because something cannot be cut and dried or nicely weighed or measured, therefore it does not exist.

Lord Reid (Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964)

One important requirement of natural justice is that the objector should have the opportunity to know and meet the case against him.

Professor Wade, Administrative Law