Abstract
The diplomatic realignment which took place after the Boer War was in large measure a response to Britain’s shifting imperial position. Well before that imperial clash highlighted Britain’s weakness, statesmen had become conscious of the increasing international tensions at the periphery of the Empire. During Salisbury’s last administration, there were clashes with other powers in almost every part of the world. It had become clear that the British navy was over-taxed and that sea power itself could not adequately defend all of Britain’s far-flung possessions. The fact that the navy could no longer protect the Straits from a Russian attack led to a reorientation in Salisbury’s thinking. It was decided to withdraw from Constantinople and build up British strength along the Nile. In the Western hemisphere, the Americans were flexing their muscles and after President Cleveland’s belligerent message to Congress during the Venezuelan crisis, the Cabinet forced a reluctant Salisbury to recognise the need for one-sided concessions. So began a retreat from American continental concerns and waters which was confirmed by the Hay — Pauncefote Treaty of 1901. No British army could hold the Canadian frontier; the fleet could not patrol American hemispheric waters. In Central Asia and China there were clashes with Russia. In Africa, quite apart from the problem of the Transvaal, there were the conflicts with France over the Nile and Niger territories. And the Germans had arrived demanding a share of the imperial spoils.
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Notes and References
Quoted in Grenville, Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy, p. 299.
C. H. D. Howard, Splendid Isolation (1967) p. 9.
Ibid., p. 10.
Ibid., p. 29.
Ibid., p. 19.
J. L. Garvin, Life of Joseph Chamberlain, vol. III (1934) p. 315.
B.D. vol. II, no. 17.
B.D. vol. II, no. 85.
B.D. vol. II, no. 86.
Sanderson to Lascelles (5 Mar 1912); quoted in Monger, The End of Isolation (1963) p. 70.
For details, see I. Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, The Diplomacy of Two Island Kingdoms (1966).
Howard, Splendid Isolation, p. 94.
On the French side, see C. Andrews, Théophile Delcassé and the Making of the Entente Cordiale (1968).
Monger, End of Isolation, p. 82.
For details see A. Marder, British Naval Policy, 1895–1905 (New York, 1948).
Monger, End of Isolation, pp. 177-8.
B.D. vol III, no. 94.
For a history of the C.I.D. and its role in the Conservative period, see F. A. Johnson, Defence by Committee (1960) and J. Gooch, Plans of War (1974).
Gooch, ibid., p. 281.
Monger, End of Isolation, p. 178.
Keith Robbins, Sir Edward Grey (1971) p. 13.
H. G. C. Matthew, The Liberal Imperialists (1973) p. 119.
Z. Steiner, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy (1969) p. 84.
Matthew, Liberal Imperialists, p. 204.
Robbins, Sir Edward Grey, p. 131.
Ibid.
G. M. Trevelyan, Grey of Fallodon (1937) pp. 83-4.
Robbins, Sir Edward Grey, p. 132.
Spender Mss. Add. Mss. 46389: Grey to Spender (19 Oct 1905).
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© 1977 Zara S. Steiner
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Steiner, Z.S. (1977). The Diplomatic Response. In: Britain and the Origins of the First World War. The Making of the 20th Century. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-15841-6_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-15841-6_3
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