There can be no doubt that the profound economic crisis which beset Chile in 1972 and 1973 was a contributory factor to the coup of 11 September, 1973. The widespread shortages, the necessity to queue for hours for certain basic goods, the frustration of not being able to obtain crucial spare parts and repairs, the frequency of strikes, and an uncontrollable inflation — all these helped to create a climate propitious for a military intervention to put an end to the ‘chaos’. The aim of the Chilean Right was, of course, to produce precisely the sort of ‘chaos’ which would encourage a military coup. In this they succeeded. It is impossible to deal with the Chilean economic crisis as if it were something amenable to a technocratic solution. The roots of the crisis were political, and the solution to the crisis could only be political. It is only international agency and banking reports which try to pretend otherwise.
KeywordsForeign Exchange Real Wage Money Supply Communist Party Spare Part
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