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O. Williamson’s Model of Managerial Discretion

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Modern Microeconomics
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Abstract

Williamson1 argues that managers have discretion in pursuing policies which maximise their own utility rather than attempting the maximisation of profits which maximises the utility of owner-shareholders. Profit acts as a constraint to this managerial behaviour, in that the financial market and the shareholders require a minimum profit to be paid out in the form of dividends, otherwise the job security of managers is endangered.

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© 1975 A. Koutsoyiannis

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Koutsoyiannis, A. (1975). O. Williamson’s Model of Managerial Discretion. In: Modern Microeconomics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-15603-0_17

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