Abstract
Williamson1 argues that managers have discretion in pursuing policies which maximise their own utility rather than attempting the maximisation of profits which maximises the utility of owner-shareholders. Profit acts as a constraint to this managerial behaviour, in that the financial market and the shareholders require a minimum profit to be paid out in the form of dividends, otherwise the job security of managers is endangered.
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© 1975 A. Koutsoyiannis
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Koutsoyiannis, A. (1975). O. Williamson’s Model of Managerial Discretion. In: Modern Microeconomics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-15603-0_17
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-15603-0_17
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-0-333-18285-7
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-15603-0
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