Abstract
I shall start by considering the apparently paradoxical doctrines that Wittgenstein put forward about knowledge: they show how the concept of knowledge is, as he says, ‘specialized’. This is not, as I shall show, a very important issue in itself, but it leads on to other points, of more interest: how it comes about, for example, that ‘not all corrections of our beliefs are on the same level’. I shall then discuss the idea that we inherit a certain picture of the world that forms the background of our experiments and researches. This idea, which is not of course unique to Wittgenstein, is, however, developed with many fresh insights. I end with some discussion of Wittgenstein’s reported views on religious belief, which should not, in my opinion, be regarded as part of his contribution to philosophy, the interest of them being, perhaps, more biographical than philosophical.
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© 1974 The Royal Institute of Philosophy
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Coope, C. (1974). Wittgenstein’s Theory of Knowledge. In: Understanding Wittgenstein. Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-15546-0_15
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-15546-0_15
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-0-333-17149-3
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-15546-0
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