Abstract
It is sometimes said that a human being has a soul, whereas animals and lifeless things do not. The distinction made is of significance probably for most religions. Although it sets man apart and places him in a unique category, it should not be taken to imply that there is no difference between what is alive and has sentience, apart from man, and what is lifeless and unconscious. This was Descartes’ error. For he ran together several distinctions and equated the soul with consciousness.
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© 1974 The Royal Institute of Philosophy
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Dilman, İ. (1974). Wittgenstein on the Soul. In: Understanding Wittgenstein. Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-15546-0_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-15546-0_11
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-0-333-17149-3
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-15546-0
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