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External Policy: Hopes are Dupes

  • Margaret Gowing

Abstract

As it turned out, the hopes were very brief indeed. Within a year from the meeting of the three heads of government in November 1945 it was almost certain that the United Nations attempt to produce a scheme for the international control of atomic energy was going to fail. Within nine months from the meeting the Americans had made most forms of atomic collaboration with all other countries, including Britain and Canada, illegal. The Truman-Attlee agreement that there should be ‘full and effective co-operation’ had not proved worth the paper it was written on.

Keywords

Prime Minister Atomic Energy Atomic Bomb Atomic Energy Commission Fissile Material 
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References

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    See, e.g., Bertrand Goldschmidt, Rivalités Atomiques (Fayard, 1967).Google Scholar
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Copyright information

© United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority 1974

Authors and Affiliations

  • Margaret Gowing

There are no affiliations available

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