Abstract
There are at least two reasons why language has always been an intriguing object of study. First, there is the supposition that language is a distinctively human possession, one that marks us off in some way from other inhabitants of the animal kingdom. Given this supposition, it is not unnatural for there to be a belief that to achieve an understanding of language is to make a significant step towards an understanding of our own nature. Second, language has been studied for the more practical reason that many difficulties arise from its misuse. The hope here is that an understanding of language will lead to an understanding and avoidance of these difficulties.
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Notes
Noam Chomsky, Cartesian Linguistics (New York, 1966).
J. J. Katz, The Philosophy of Language (New York, 1966) ch. 1.
See J. O. Urmson, ‘Some Questions Concerning Validity,’ in A. G. N. Flew (ed.), Essays in Conceptual Analysis (London, 1956).
See K. S. Donnellan, ‘The Paradigm Case Argument’, in Paul Edwards (ed.), The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (New York, 1967) for a fuller discussion and bibliography.
H. Putnam, ‘Dreaming and Depth Grammar’, in R. Butler (ed.), Analytical Philosophy (Oxford, 1962).
H. Putnam, ‘Brains and Behaviour’, in R. Butler (ed.), Analytical Philosophy, Second Series (Oxford, 1965).
L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford, 1963) para. 242.
Max Black, Language and Philosophy (Ithaca, N.Y., 1969) ch. 1.
J. L. Austin, How to do Things with Words (Oxford, 1962).
G. Ryle, ‘If, So and Because’, in Max Black (ed.), Philosophical Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1963).
W. V. O. Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge, Mass., 1960) ch. 2.
R. Quirk and J. Svartvik, Investigating Linguistic Acceptability (The Hague, 1966).
N. Malcolm, Knowledge and Certainty (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1963).
L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (London, 1923) para. 2 4.0031.
A. G. N. Flew (ed.), Logic and Language, First Series (Oxford, 1951).
A. G. N. Flew (ed.), Logic and Language, Second Series (Oxford, 1953).
J. J. Katz and J. A. Fodor, ‘The Structure of Semantic Theory’, in Fodor and Katz, The Structure of Language (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1964).
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© 1971 Macmillan Publishers Limited
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Lyas, C. (1971). Editor’s Introduction. In: Lyas, C. (eds) Philosophy and Linguistics. Controversies in Philosophy. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-15426-5_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-15426-5_1
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