Further remarks on sensations and brain processes

Abstract

In a discussion of my article ‘Sensations and brain processes’ J. T. Stevenson distinguishes two sorts of properties.¹ M-properties are those properties, for example of brain processes, which I can allow in my physicalist scheme. P-properties are those properties of sensations which prevent us from defining ‘sensation’ in terms of M-properties. Stevenson then points out that some of these P-properties will be nomological danglers, that is, connected to M-properties by ultimate psycho-physical laws, and so I am not any better off in this respect than is the traditional dualist. My reply is that I do not admit that there are any such P-properties. The way in which I avoid admitting P-properties is indicated in my reply to Objection 3 in the original article, but I did not make myself sufficiently clear.