Advertisement

Aquinas pp 340-382 | Cite as

The First Principle of Practical Reason

A Commentary on the Summa theologiae, 1–2, Question 94, Article 2
  • Germain G. Grisez
Chapter
Part of the Modern Studies in Philosophy book series (MOSTPH)

Abstract

Many proponents and critics of Thomas Aquinas’ theory of natural law have understood it roughly as follows. The first principle of practical reason is a command: Do good and avoid evil. Man discovers this imperative in his conscience; it is like an inscription written there by the hand of God. Having become aware of this basic commandment, man consults his nature to see what is good and what is evil. He examines an action in comparison with his essence to see whether the action fits human nature or does not fit it. If the action fits, it is seen to be good; if it does not fit, it is seen to be bad. Once we know that a certain kind of action—for instance, stealing—is bad, we have two premises, “Avoid evil” and “Stealing is evil,” from whose conjunction is deduced: “Avoid stealing.” All specific commandments of natural law are derived in this way.1

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Copyright information

© Anthony Kenny 1969

Authors and Affiliations

  • Germain G. Grisez

There are no affiliations available

Personalised recommendations