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Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom

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Aquinas

Part of the book series: Modern Studies in Philosophy ((MOSTPH))

Abstract

In this paper I intend to discuss whether belief in God’s foreknowledge of the future is compatible with belief in the freedom of human actions. Before stating the problem in further detail, I must make clear which problems I do not intend to consider. I shall not discuss whether there is a God, nor whether it is the case that some human actions are free. I shall not try to show that an action which is causally determined is not free, nor that God knows the future free actions of men. It might be thought, indeed that this last at least needs no proving: surely, if there is a God at all, He knows all that is to come; a God who did not know the future would not be a real God. But this is not so. It is indeed the case that any God worthy of the name knows everything that there is to be known; but it does not follow from this alone that He knows the future free actions of men. For many philosophers have maintained, and some do maintain, that statements about as yet undecided free actions, such as the statement “The United States will declare war on China”, are as yet neither true nor false.

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Anthony Kenny

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© 1969 Anthony Kenny

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Kenny, A. (1969). Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom. In: Kenny, A. (eds) Aquinas. Modern Studies in Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-15356-5_11

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