Abstract
Suppose we never break through the ‘is-ought’ barrier, what then? Let us speculate. Then we can never justify ethics and morality. Well, perhaps this would only be true for naturalists, empiricists, emotivists, i.e. for those who believe that statements are justified only if supported by ‘is’ statements. Hold on. How could they talk about statements being ‘justified’ only if supported by ‘is’ statements, if by ‘justified’ they mean ‘ought to be believed’? Would not this be one case of an ‘ought’ statement in the need of being justified by being supported by ‘is’ statements, one alleged break through the ‘is-ought’ barrier?
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© 1969 Macmillan Publishers Limited
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Zimmerman, M. (1969). The ‘is-ought’: An unnecessary dualism. In: Hudson, W.D. (eds) The Is-Ought Question. Controversies in Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-15336-7_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-15336-7_8
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-0-333-10597-9
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