Goodness and choice

Abstract

It is often said nowadays that the meaning of the word ‘good’ is to be explained by talking about some necessary connection between calling things good and choosing them. This theory is thought to have the following merits, (i) It seems to distinguish ‘good’ from such terms as ‘yellow’ and ‘square’ without talking about peculiar non-natural properties. (2) It seems to show how a value judgement in general, and a moral judgement in particular, is, as Hume insisted, essentially practical, being supposed ‘to influence our passions and actions, and to go beyond the calm and indolent judgements of the understanding’ (Treatise, III. i. i). (3) It seems to solve the problem of how ‘good’ can have the same meaning when applied to many diverse things; the relation to choice being offered as the thread on which these different uses are all strung. Nevertheless, the subject is full of obscurities and uncertainties, as we can see if we try to answer questions such as these. (I) Is a connection with the choices of the speaker ever a sufficient condition for the use of the word ‘good’, as it would be if a man could ever call certain things (let us call them A’s) good A’s merely because these were the A’s which he was thereafter ready to choose?