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Descriptive and Normative Implications of the Decision-Theory Postulates

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Abstract

Most decisions of importance are made under conditions of uncertainty. In choosing among various courses of action we are not sure what the outcome of any particular action will be. A number of decision-making theories have been proposed for such situations. In this paper we shall deal with one particular theory of decisionmaking under uncertainty. This theory is based on the concepts of personal probability and utility and may be stated in the form of a set of postulates. Various sets of postulates have been formulated; the postulates we shall use are essentially the same as those of L. J. Savage (1954).

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© 1968 International Economic Association

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Maccrimmon, K.R. (1968). Descriptive and Normative Implications of the Decision-Theory Postulates. In: Borch, K., Mossin, J. (eds) Risk and Uncertainty. International Economic Association Conference Volumes, Numbers 1–50. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-15248-3_1

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