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The Nature of the Judgment

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In the Shadow of Sharpeville

Abstract

Those who cannot listen straight, remember straight or intervene dispassionately are unlikely to be any more objective when weighing conflicting testimony. Nor was this judge. Nor by inference were the two assessors who sit with a judge in any trial where the death sentence might be imposed. The judge ruled on points of law. The three of them decided by simple majority the facts of the case and whether extenuating circumstances existed sufficient to justify not imposing a sentence of death. Over the Sharpeville accused there was no dissent.

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Notes

  1. The judge’s reasoning against Oupa is demolished by E. Cameron, ‘Inferential Reasoning and Extenuation in the Case of the Sharpeville Six’, (1988) 1 SACJ 243–60.

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Authors

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© 1998 Peter Parker and Joyce Mokhesi-Parker

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Parker, P., Mokhesi-Parker, J. (1998). The Nature of the Judgment. In: In the Shadow of Sharpeville. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-14617-8_10

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