Abstract
The Majoritarian Compromise proposal, aside from its substantive merits, provides an opportunity to illustrate various aspects of mechanism and institution design, and, in particular, to clarify the concepts used in the analysis of design. Many of these concepts also underlie models used in economic analysis. What follows is an outline of some of the issues.
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© 1999 International Economic Association
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Hurwicz, L., Sertel, M.R. (1999). Designing Mechanisms, in Particular for Electoral Systems: The Majoritarian Compromise. In: Sertel, M.R. (eds) Contemporary Economic Issues. International Economic Association Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-14540-9_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-14540-9_4
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