Abstract
Earlier, in Chapter 2, we had occasion to examine in detail the arguments in support of the idea of neutrality about the good advanced by Ronald Dworkin in “Liberalism”. In his Tanner Lectures published in 1990, Dworkin offered an account and defense of liberalism significantly different from and more ambitious than that earlier view. In these lectures, Dworkin, like Raz, rejected the idea of a merely political liberalism advanced by Rawls, and set out instead to show that the principles of liberal political order were founded upon a distinctive ethical view (the “challenge model”) which spoke directly to the question of the good. This suggests a form of perfectionist liberalism. However, this chapter tries to show that a lingering neutralism undermines Dworkin’s attempt to articulate a comprehensive perfectionist liberalism, and that this neutralism also leads Dworkin to treat those who think otherwise than he does in an illiberal, or at least ungenerous, fashion.
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Notes
Ronald Dworkin, “Foundations of Liberal Equality,” in Grethe B. Peterson, ed., The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, vol. 11 (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1990), pp. 1–119; important companion pieces are Ronald Dworkin, “What is Equality? Part 3: The Place of Liberty,” Iowa Law Review, vol. 73, no. 1 (1987), pp. 1–54; Ronald Dworkin, “What is Equality? Part 4: Political Equality,” University of San Francisco Law Review, vol. 22, no. 1 (Fall, 1987), pp. 1–30; and Ronald Dworkin, “Liberal Community,” California Law Review, vol. 77, no. 3 (May, 1989), pp. 479–504. The latter piece is responded to by Philip Selznick, “Dworkin’s Unfinished Task,” and Bernard Williams, “Dworkin on Community and Critical Interests,” in the same issue, pp. 505–20. Aside from these, there is a brief critical discussion in Richard J. Arneson, “Liberal Democratic Community,” in John W. Chapman and Ian Shapiro, eds, Democratic Community: Nomos XXXV (New York: New York University Press, 1993), pp. 197–202. Even briefer, though interesting, remarks of commentary can be found in Ronald Beiner, What’s the Matter With Liberalism? (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), p. 71, and John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 211.
Ronald Dworkin, “Liberalism,” in Stuart Hampshire, ed., Public and Private Morality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. 113–43.
See John Rawls, “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 14, no. 3 (Summer, 1985), p. 246. This language has been removed from the text of Political Liberalism.
Other “minimalist” works would include Judith Shklar, “The Liberalism of Fear,” in Nancy Rosenblum, ed., Liberalism and the Moral Life (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991), pp. 21–38, and Charles Larmore, “Political Liberalism,” Political Theory, vol. 18, no. 3 (August, 1990), pp. 339–60. Other “perfectionist” works would include William Galston, Liberal Purposes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), and Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990).
Discussions of Raz’s perfectionist liberal theory include: Robert George, “The Unorthodox Liberalism of Joseph Raz,” Review of Politics, vol. 53, no. 4 (Fall, 1991), pp. 652–71; Margaret Moore, “Liberalism and the Ideal of the Good Life,” Review of Politics, vol. 53, no. 4 (Fall, 1991), pp. 672–90; Jeremy Waldron, “Autonomy and Perfectionism in Raz’s Morality of Freedom,” Southern California Law Review, vol. 62 (1989), pp. 1130–53; Wojciech Sadurski, “Joseph Raz on Liberal Neutrality and the Harm Principle,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 10, no. 1 (1990), pp. 130–3; W.J. Waluchow, “Critical Notice of Joseph Raz: The Morality of Freedom,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 19, no. 3 (September, 1989), pp. 476–9.
See Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), especially pp. 110–62 and 401–30.
Ibid., p. 390.
Ibid., p. 395.
Ibid., p. 392.
Brian Barry, “How Not to Defend Liberal Institutions,” in B. Douglass, G. Mara and H. Richardson, eds, Liberalism and the Good (New York: Routledge, 1990), pp. 50–1; emphasis added.
See Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), pp. 157–62.
Joseph Raz, “Liberalism, Skepticism and Democracy,” Iowa Law Review, vol. 74, no. 3 (1989), p. 780.
See the suggestive remarks in this vein in Robert George, “The Unorthodox Liberalism of Joseph Raz,” Review of Politics, vol. 53, no. 4 (Fall, 1991), pp. 652–71.
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© 1997 Patrick Neal
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Neal, P. (1997). Dworkin on the Foundations of Liberal Equality. In: Liberalism and Its Discontents. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-14362-7_8
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