Abstract
One of the most attractive recent defenses of liberal politics is based upon the idea of the state acting as a neutral authority to fairly order the terms of interaction between the competing interests, both moral and material, of the various groups and individuals in society. This chapter aims to reveal the inadequacies of this idea through a critical analysis of Ronald Dworkin’s articulation of it.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
Ronald Dworkin, “Liberalism,” in S. Hampshire, ed., Public and Private Morality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. 113–43. Other relevant works by Dworkin include “What Is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 10, no. 3 (Summer, 1981), pp. 185–246; “What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 10, no. 4 (Fall, 1981), pp. 283–345; Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977), especially Chapters 6, 7, 11.
Bruce Ackerman, Social Justice and the Liberal State (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1980). Ackerman’s argument is criticized by various authors in Ethics, vol. 93, no. 1 (January 1983), pp. 330–71.
Ronald Dworkin, “What Liberalism Is Not,” New York Review of Books, January 20, 1983, pp. 47–9; see also his “Why Liberals Should Believe in Equality,” New York Review of Books, February 3, 1983, pp. 32–4.
Ackerman considers this practice to be that of politics. This is, however, a contentious issue. It is Hobbes whom Ackerman is unwittingly following here; see Bernard Williams, “Space Talk: The Conversation Continued,” Ethics, vol. 93, no. 1 (January, 1983), pp. 367–71.
See, for example, Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), pp. 198–228.
In terms artfully elaborated by Jon Elster, this strategy fails to distinguish the “feasible set” from the “possible set” of choices open to an agent within a social context. See his Ulysses and the Sirens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 112–13.
C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962).
See Douglas Rae, “An Altimeter for Mr. Escher’s Stairway: A Comment on William Riker’s ‘Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions,’” American Political Science Review, vol. 74, no. 2 (June, 1980), pp. 451–5.
A suspicion shared by Patrick Riley, Will and Political Legitimacy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982), especially pp. 125–62.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 1997 Patrick Neal
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Neal, P. (1997). Liberalism and Neutrality. In: Liberalism and Its Discontents. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-14362-7_2
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-14362-7_2
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-14364-1
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-14362-7
eBook Packages: Palgrave Political & Intern. Studies CollectionPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)