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Theory and Practice of Confederate Finances

  • Dubravko Mihaljek

Abstract

Recent coalescing and splintering movements in Europe and other parts of the world have highlighted the importance of political and constitutional constraints on the design of interjurisdictional fiscal arrangements, and challenged public finance analysts to understand why it is that nations enter or leave such arrangements. In an attempt to address these important issues, this chapter looks at the historical experiences of confederations — that is, structures in which the ‘federal’ government is subordinate to ‘lower-level’ governments — and at the key issues that arise in the design of fiscal arrangements within confederations.

Keywords

Member State Central Government Fiscal Policy Monetary Union Currency Union 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 1998

Authors and Affiliations

  • Dubravko Mihaljek

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