Abstract

rate-of-return regulation versus price regulation for public utilities. Public utility regulation arose naturally in the nineteenth century for gas, water, rail, telegraph, and later, electricity and telephony because these utilities require a fixed network to deliver their services. These networks need access to rights of way which requires community or government approval, while the network is a natural monopoly that precludes efficient competition and confers potentially exploitative power on the owner that will inevitably lead to political demands for restraint. The durable, costly and irrecoverable nature of the network raises the fear that curbs on prices will prevent the investor recovering a fair return on his investment. Regulation evolved to balance the interests of investors and consumer/voters. Where a satisfactory balance could be achieved, utilities could remain under regulated private ownership. If private investors lacked confidence that they would be allowed to earn an acceptable return, or if the polity believed that it could secure a more satisfactory distribution of the benefits of the public utility, the outcome was public ownership. Britain and the US exemplified different solutions to achieving this balance of interests.

Keywords

Formaldehyde Marketing Diesel Sewage Dispatch 

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© Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 1998

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  • Peter Newman

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