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The Mental Element

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Criminal Law

Part of the book series: Macmillan Law Masters ((MLM))

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Abstract

The majority of criminal offences require, in addition to the actus reus, a specific state of mind on the part of the accused, usually referred to as the mens rea. Many less serious crimes require no mens rea, but simply proof that the defendant caused the prohibited harm. These are known as strict liability crimes and will be discussed separately in Chapter 6. They tend to be crimes that carry lower sentences and focus on discouraging a particular harm rather than imposing moral blame. Most serious crimes require proof of some a guilty state of mind, for example that the defendant intended or foresaw a particular result. The draft Criminal Code Bill uses the ‘fault element’ rather than mens rea and states:

‘fault element; means an element of an offence consisting:

  1. (a)

    of a state of mind with which a person acts; or

  2. (b)

    of a failure to comply with a standard of conduct; or

  3. (c)

    partly of such a state of mind and partly of such a failure’ (clause 6).

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Bibliography and Further Reading

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© 1998 Marise Cremona and Jonathan Herring

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Herring, J., Cremona, M. (1998). The Mental Element. In: Criminal Law. Macmillan Law Masters. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-13561-5_4

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