Human Separateness and the Possibility of Communion: Marcel’s Rejection of Sartrean Solipsism
Sartre, we have seen, is adept at running together the ontological and the psychological. He does this in what concerns us now by representing conditions that must be fulfilled for a person to count as an individual as needs that may be attributed to individual human beings. In his discussion of human relationships he thus makes certain psychological generalizations and takes them as underwritten by his ontology. He then draws certain conclusions concerning human beings as such which are valid only for the particular psychology he reads into human relationships. His contention thus is that human beings are capable of only certain kinds of relationships. When we claim otherwise and point to the names we have for the possibilities Sartre denies, he gives a reductive analysis of the concepts thus named.
KeywordsPermeability Resi Clarification
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.